Upon receiving notice of a debtor’s bankruptcy case, the prudent debt collector typically files a proof of claim, in the hope of receiving some distribution from the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. Absent a fraudulent claim by the debt collector, the Bankruptcy Code specifically provides for the filing of claims against the debtor’s estate. So how could a debt collector be sued for doing what the Code allows? It could happen if debts a collector actually holds are barred from enforcement under a state statute of limitations.
A recent decision out of the Southern District of Georgia shows the collateral impact of the Crawfordv. LVNV Funding proof of claim decision issued by the Eleventh Circuit.
On July 14, 2016, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that the restructuring of a planned $1.5 billion transaction between Tullett Prebon Group Ltd. (Tullett Prebon) and ICAP plc adequately addresses the DOJ’s concerns that the transaction would violate Section 8 of the Clayton Act by creating an interlocking directorate. The parties restructured their transaction after the DOJ issued a Second Request to adequately investigate the parties post-closing ownership structure.
Section 546(e) of the bankruptcy code prohibits a bankruptcy trustee from avoiding “settlement payment[s]”, or payments “made in connection with a securities contract,” that are “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” qualifying financial entities, including financial institutions, stockbrokers, commodities brokers and others.
A Chapter 11 debtor’s financial advisers were entitled to a “Success Fee” based on a percentage of a $50-million “debt-to-equity conversion,” held a split U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on May 4, 2016. In re Valence Technology, Inc., 2016 WL 2587109, *1 (5th Cir. May 4, 2016) (2-1). Key to the opinion was the parties’ concession that the “debt-to-equity conversion qualified as a Private Placement under [their] engagement agreements.” Id., at n.1.
In FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP,1 the Seventh Circuit recently held that transfers are not protected under the safe harbor of section 546(e) of the U.S.
In 2014 the Eleventh Circuit held that a debt collector violates the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act when it filed a proof of claim in a chapter 13 case on a debt that it knows to be time-barred. Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Circ. 2014).
Two recent cases serve as reminders the devil is truly in the details.
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. July 29, 2016)
The bankruptcy court denies the debtor’s motion to transfer venue of his chapter 7 bankruptcy case from the Terra Haute Division to the Evansville Division. The debtor failed to satisfy the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1412 for venue transfer. The debtor’s travel time to each court location was virtually the same, and thus Evansville was no more convenient than Terra Haute. Further, there was no showing that the interests of justice would be better served by the transfer. Opinion below.
Judge: Graham
The Missouri Commercial Receivership Act (MCRA), passed by the Missouri legislature and just signed into law by Governor Nixon, becomes effective Aug. 28, 2016. It expands, clarifies and fleshes out the existing minimal receivership statute. The MCRA (Sections 515.500 through 515.665 of MO Senate Bill No. 578) outlines a new standardized system for receivership administration under the auspices of the Missouri courts.