Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court, in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., Case No. 16-784, ruled that the “securities safe harbor” under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, does not shield transferees from liability simply because a particular transaction was routed through a financial intermediary—so-called “conduit transactions.”

On February 27, 2018, the Supreme Court handed down a unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Sotomayor, resolving a Circuit split over the interpretation of Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “safe harbor” provision that shields specified types of payments “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a financial institution from avoidance on fraudulent transfer grounds.

On February 27, 2018, a unanimous Supreme Court held in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc. (link here) that an otherwise-avoidable transfer is not subject to the safe harbor in Section 546(e) (which provides, in relevant part, a trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution” or that “is a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . .

On February 27, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc. The key issue in the case was the scope of Section 546(e) of the bankruptcy code which insulates certain transactions from a bankruptcy trustee’s statutory avoidance powers. A bankruptcy trustee may avoid many types of pre-petition transfers, including preferential payments made to creditors within 90 days of a bankruptcy petition and transfers made for less than reasonably equivalent value completed within two years of a bankruptcy filing.

Our post last year concerning “[t]he long-running litigation spawned by the leveraged buyout of Tribune Company . . . and the subsequent bankruptcy case”[1] described a case--FTI v. Merit[2]--that was then pending in the Supreme Court.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit recently held that the constructive notice provisions of section 1301.401 of the Ohio Revised Code do not limit a bankruptcy trustee’s avoidance powers as a hypothetical judgment lien creditor under section 544(a)(1) of the federal Bankruptcy Code.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

In a decision approved for publication, New Jersey’s Appellate Division recently remanded an action to the Chancery Division in order to determine whether a lender improperly collected more than one-hundred percent of the debts owed to it. SeeBrunswick Bank & Tr. v. Heln Mgmt. LLC, 2018 WL 987809 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 21, 2018). In the case, the lender made five construction loans to two entities, which were guaranteed by the entities’ principal and his daughter.

In Mission Product Holdings Inc. v. Old Cold LLC (In re Old Cold LLC), 879 F.3d 376 (1st Cir. 2018), the First Circuit held that a sale in possible violation of the Supreme Court’s Jevic decision does not allow an appellate court to examine the merits of the sale when the sale-approval order otherwise is statutorily moot under section 363(m).

On February 13, 2018, the Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction in an appeal emanating from a hot button issue in contested foreclosures – can the borrower in a foreclosure secure an award of contractual attorney’s fees after successfully defending the foreclosure on the basis that the lender lacked standing to enforce the mortgage contract?

Last week, President Trump unveiled his proposal to fix our nation’s aging infrastructure. While the proposal lauded $1.5 trillion in new spending, it only included $200 billion in federal funding. To bridge this sizable gap, the plan largely relies on public private partnerships (often referred to as P3s) that can use tax-exempt bond financing.