Section 549 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a trustee or debtor in possession to avoid (and ultimately recover) a transfer of the debtor’s property “that occurs after the commencement of the case” and “is not authorized under this title or by the court.” 11 U.S.C. § 549. This sensible provision safeguards property of the estate for ratable distribution to creditors in accordance with the priorities established by the Bankruptcy Code and provides the Trustee with the necessary authority to pursue transferees that receive property of the estate without Court approval.
Recent caselaw demonstrates that there is a current judicial disagreement over whether the Bankruptcy Code will permit a cramdown in a jointly-administered bankruptcy case when a consenting class exists for only one of the debtors. This implicates the important issue of de facto substantive consolidation and the potential risks it poses to unsecured creditors.
The California Court of Appeals recently held that a mortgage (the “Mortgage”) recorded simultaneously with a home equity line of credit (the “HELOC”) had priority and was not entitled to any surplus proceedings from the foreclosure of the HELOC, despite the fact that the HELOC’s instrument number was prior to that of the Mortgage. SeeMTC Fin., Inc. v. Nationstar Mortg., 19 Cal. App. 5th 811 (Ct. App. 2018).
In an action against a Florida consumer plaintiffs’ firm that also functions as consumer bankruptcy debtors’ counsel, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy attorney violates section 526(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code if he instructs a client to pay his legal fees using a credit card.
In so ruling, the Court held that there is no requirement under the statute that the advice be given for an invalid purpose designed to manipulate the bankruptcy process.
The Nevada Supreme Court recently affirmed a lower court’s decision that a foreclosure under a Nevada statute giving “super priority” to homeowners’ association liens was preempted by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”) in a foreclosure in which the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) held a mortgage. SeeSatico Bay LLC Series 9641 Christine View v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc., 2018 WL 1448731 (Nev. Mar. 21, 2018). In 2004, the borrowers purchased a property with a home loan that was secured by a deed of trust on the property.
There are unique and competing interests between the United States Bankruptcy Code1 and federal and state environmental laws. One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is to allow a debtor to have a "fresh start." On the other hand, environmental laws are intended to require responsible parties to comply with environmental standards for the protection of human health and the environment. As a result of these competing interests, there has been extensive litigation related to the interplay between the bankruptcy and environmental regimes.
The Bankruptcy Code often instructs a trustee or debtor to perform an act or make an election within a certain time. Sometimes the relevant provisions are intended to benefit a party in interest who is affected by a debtor’s or trustee’s action or election. Unfortunately, some of the provisions that prescribe a trustee or debtor to act fail to provide a remedy to the affected party in interest in the event the trustee or debtor does not act in compliance with the Code.
On April 3, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied a motion to move an action, filed by a group of online payday lenders (defendants), from Pennsylvania to Texas. The defendants—who filed for bankruptcy in Texas last year—sought to centralize lawsuits referred to by the court as ”rent-a-bank” and “rent-a-tribe” schemes.
In In re Palmaz Scientific Inc., the bankruptcy court for the Western District of Texas determined that a confirmed plan of reorganization would not stop a group of investors from pursuing direct (non-derivative) claims against directors and officers of the debtor companies because plan injunction language only covered claims against the debtors. 2018 WL 1036780, at *5 (Bankr. W.D.
New Jersey’s Appellate Division recently reversed a lower court and held that a lender erred by not serving a notice of intent to foreclose (“NOI”) before commencing a foreclosure action on a residential reverse mortgage. SeeNationstar Mortg., LLC d/b/a Champion Mortg. Co. v. Armstrong, 2018 WL 1386247 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. March 20, 2018). In the case, defendant, as his mother’s attorney-in-fact, obtained a reverse mortgage on her home. The mother died shortly thereafter and, pursuant to 24 C.F.R.