The Ward and Anderson families have been involved in the cinema business in Ireland for over sixty years. Several of the families’ principal cinema assets were operated through a jointly–owned company, Dublin Cinema Group Ltd (DCG). Following a number of disagreements over the years, including the bringing of a derivative action for alleged beach of fiduciary duty against one of the company directors, a petition to wind up the company was brought before the Commercial Court in January 2013.
In a recent High Court case, a liquidator sought an order declaring that certain payments made by a company prior to its liquidation were a ‘fraudulent preference’ and invalid. The company had made payments to its overdrawn bank account which was personally guaranteed by one of its directors. It was alleged that the payments were made in order to reduce the company’s overdraft and therefore, the director’s own personal exposure under the guarantees.
Once a company has entered into a formal insolvency process, all its assets must be realised and distributed in accordance with the Companies Acts. An attempt to prefer a particular creditor up to two years prior to an insolvent liquidation can be declared void by the courts on the application of the liquidator of the insolvent company. To succeed on such an application, however, the liquidator must prove that the dominant intention of the insolvent company at the time it entered into the transaction was to prefer the creditor in question.
The term “pre-pack”, as it relates to insolvency sales, can have different meanings in different jurisdictions. In essence it refers to a sale of a distressed company or asset where the purchaser or investor has been identified and the terms of the sale have been fully negotiated before an insolvency process occurs. The advantage to the “pre-pack” structure is that the sale can be completed immediately upon or closely after the appointment of the insolvency office holder and, critically, without material interruption to the trading activity of the target company or asset.
In an insolvent winding up, preferential creditors are entitled to be paid first from assets subject to a charge which at the time of creation was floating, regardless of whether the floating charge has crystallised at the commencement of the winding up.
TheCentral Bank and Credit Institutions (Resolution) Bill 2011 seeks to establish a more permanent and a wider framework for dealing with insolvent banks and banks in financial difficulty. It is intended that the legislation would replace and extend the provisions contained in the Credit Institutions (Stabilisation) Act 2010.
The new Bill was published to meet the end of February deadline set under the terms of the EU-IMF Financial Support Agreement.
Introduction
Prior to 25 March 2011, there was no judicial decision in Ireland on whether the holder of a floating charge could validly improve its position in the order of priority of payments, vis-à-vis preferential creditors, in circumstances where its floating charge crystallises (i.e. converts into a fixed charge) prior to commencement of the winding up of a company.
Overview
In the recent High Court decision of McInerney Homes Limited, the court has ruled for the first time that proposals for a scheme of arrangement (the “Scheme”) entailing payment to a secured creditor of a written down sum in full satisfaction of its debt, could be approved. However, on the facts of the case the court held that the objecting secured creditors would be unfairly prejudiced if they were required to accept the sum proposed to be paid, and, accordingly, refused to approve the Scheme.
As part of the IMF/EU bailout, Ireland will need to put draft legislation before the Dail to facilitate the creation of a legal framework for dealing with financial institutions on the verge of collapse. This legal framework is known as a Special Resolution Regime (SRR).
Toward the end of 2009 the Republic of Ireland’s then government passed legislation which would lead to the creation of the National Assets Management Agency (NAMA). The role of NAMA was a simple one: to remove toxic debt from the books of the Irish banks to assist in attempts to revive the national economy. The security would be acquired at a discount and purchased with Government backed bonds. In the first phase of NAMA (focusing on mortgages and other secured facilities with a minimum value of £20m) over £80bn in toxic debts were acquired.