It has already been five years since the South African legislature introduced business rescue, a corporate restructuring procedure, which given the current economic climate is a concept that most corporates should now be familiar with. Despite its progressive intentions and increasing popularity, business rescue is often abused, usually by directors and stakeholders who have in-depth knowledge of the affairs of the company, the causes and consequences of the financial demise of the company, and who are often the initiators of the process.

Prescription is one word which every creditor (and attorney) dread. Prescription extinguishes a debt and there is very little a creditor can do once that proverbial ship has sailed.

The Prescription Act, No 68 of 1969 (Prescription Act), on a good day, has its challenges, but the situation is even more uncertain when an insolvent estate is concerned.

Rogers J, with Nuku J concurring, in the recent judgment of Van Deventer and Another v Nedbank Ltd 2016 (3) SA 622 (WCC) shed some very needed light on this issue.

In order for an application for business rescue to successfully suspend commenced liquidation proceedings, it must be served on the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC), together with all affected persons in terms of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act). This position was confirmed in the Gauteng Local Division’s decision handed down on 10 March 2016.

There has always been a degree of uncertainty when it comes to a business rescue practitioner’s costs and expenses incurred in the business rescue proceedings of an entity when the business recue proceedings are, for whatever reason, converted to liquidation proceedings.

Employment contracts were previously deemed to be suspended on the date of liquidation, being the date that the application for liquidation of the company is presented and issued at court in terms of s348 of the Companies Act, No 61 of 1973 (Old Companies Act). However, this position has since changed.

Can an application for business rescue be brought even after a company has been placed in final liquidation?  The short answer, thanks to a recent Supreme Court of Appeal ("SCA") decision, is yes.

In Richter v Absa Bank Limited 2015, an interpretation of 'liquidation proceedings' within the context ofsection 131(6) of the Companies Act, 71 of 2008 ("the Act"), was central to the issue before the SCA.  

Section 131(6) of the Act reads as follows:

ISSUE

Whether employees who have lodged a claim in the Labour Court against an employer that has gone into liquidation may proceed with their claim if they have not provided the liquidator with the requisite notice as required by South Africa’s company laws?

SUMMARY

The South African Revenue Service (SARS) released Binding Private Ruling 210 (Ruling) on 11 November 2015. The Ruling sets out the tax consequences of a ‘liquidation distribution’, as defined in s47(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, No 58 of 1962 (Act), followed by an ‘amalgamation transaction’ as contemplated in s44(1)(a) of the Act.

Although a tenant's insolvency does not automatically terminate the lease or confer a right upon a landlord to cancel the lease, a landlord is not left without any remedies where a tenant is in breach of the lease before the tenant is wound-up.

A recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Ellerine Brothers (Pty) Limited (Ellerine) v McCarthy Limited, clarified the legal position.

The advent of the new Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) brought with it a shift from a creditor-protectionist society towards a business rescue model that is debtor-protectionist. In consequence, there has been a swarm of applications taking advantage and exploiting this new scheme. This shift has unfortunately led to considerable abuse of the business rescue procedure.