The Supreme Court of Appeal provided clarity in Diener N.O. v Minister of Justice & Others (926/2016) regarding the ranking of the business rescue practitioner’s (BRP) claim for remuneration and expenses. The SCA also clarified whether such claim was conferred a “super preference” over all creditors, secured and unsecured in subsequent liquidation proceedings.

The recent administration of heavily indebted Uganda Telecom Limited (“UTL”) aims to achieve the best outcome for creditors and shareholders. Below, we unpack the implications of the administration for UTL’s creditors and other stakeholders.

In Ex Parte Nell and Others NO 2014 (6) SA 545 (GP) (28 July 2014), the board of a company passed a resolution placing it in business rescue in accordance with s129 of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Companies Act). In terms of this section, a financially distressed company may, without any prior judicial oversight or consultation with its creditors, achieve a general moratorium against legal proceedings.

Certain debtors have become masters of delay and indeed professional insolvents, leaving creditors and failed businesses in their wake. 

The legal moratorium is a protective mechanism inherent in business rescue proceedings. Another safety net available to debtors is the possibility of rehabilitation of insolvent estates. Debtors use these and other methods to take advantage of the system and their creditors, delaying the winding up process and impeding creditors’ recovery.

It has already been five years since the South African legislature introduced business rescue, a corporate restructuring procedure, which given the current economic climate is a concept that most corporates should now be familiar with. Despite its progressive intentions and increasing popularity, business rescue is often abused, usually by directors and stakeholders who have in-depth knowledge of the affairs of the company, the causes and consequences of the financial demise of the company, and who are often the initiators of the process.

Prescription is one word which every creditor (and attorney) dread. Prescription extinguishes a debt and there is very little a creditor can do once that proverbial ship has sailed.

The Prescription Act, No 68 of 1969 (Prescription Act), on a good day, has its challenges, but the situation is even more uncertain when an insolvent estate is concerned.

Rogers J, with Nuku J concurring, in the recent judgment of Van Deventer and Another v Nedbank Ltd 2016 (3) SA 622 (WCC) shed some very needed light on this issue.

In order for an application for business rescue to successfully suspend commenced liquidation proceedings, it must be served on the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC), together with all affected persons in terms of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act). This position was confirmed in the Gauteng Local Division’s decision handed down on 10 March 2016.

There has always been a degree of uncertainty when it comes to a business rescue practitioner’s costs and expenses incurred in the business rescue proceedings of an entity when the business recue proceedings are, for whatever reason, converted to liquidation proceedings.

Employment contracts were previously deemed to be suspended on the date of liquidation, being the date that the application for liquidation of the company is presented and issued at court in terms of s348 of the Companies Act, No 61 of 1973 (Old Companies Act). However, this position has since changed.

Can an application for business rescue be brought even after a company has been placed in final liquidation?  The short answer, thanks to a recent Supreme Court of Appeal ("SCA") decision, is yes.

In Richter v Absa Bank Limited 2015, an interpretation of 'liquidation proceedings' within the context ofsection 131(6) of the Companies Act, 71 of 2008 ("the Act"), was central to the issue before the SCA.  

Section 131(6) of the Act reads as follows: