Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and its affiliated debtors (collectively, the “Debtors”) filed a motion in the bankruptcy court on Nov. 13, 2008, asking the court to approve procedures for (i) assuming (affirming) and assigning derivative contracts entered into before the Debtors commenced their bankruptcy cases, including resolving cure amounts; and (ii) entering into settlement agreements that may establish termination payments and the return of collateral under terminated derivative contracts.
Debtors’ Derivative Contracts
“… [A]ny sale of [a foreign] debtor[’s] property [in the U.S.] outside of the ordinary course of business can be approved by the bankruptcy court only after notice, hearing, and a finding of good business reasons to permit the sale,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on May 22, 2017. In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd. (“Sentry II”), 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8860, at *11 (2d Cir. May 22, 2017).
Creditors often consider filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition against their financially distressed debtors. Before using this extraordinary remedy, a creditor should evaluate whether it will achieve a valid business objective. Additionally, each creditor should evaluate whether there is a valid basis to support the filing. When the debtor's bankruptcy is appropriate, it can be a valuable step in maximizing a creditor's recovery. But the stakes are high.
A bankruptcy court’s asset sale order limiting specific pre-bankruptcy product liability claims required prior “actual or direct mail notice” to claimants when the debtor “knew or reasonably should have known about the claims,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on July 13, 2016. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12848, *46-47 (2d Cir. July 13, 2016).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held on July 15, 2008, that a major creditor with a seat on the debtor’s board of directors and a 10.6% equity interest was not an insider in a bankruptcy preference suit. In re U.S. Medical, Inc., 2008 WL2736658 (10th Cir. 7/15/08).
An individual Chapter 11 debtor’s “estate was diminishing” with no “reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on July 5, 2016. In re Hoover, 2016 WL 3606918, *2 (1st Cir. July 5, 2016), affirming the bankruptcy court’s conversion of the case to a Chapter 7 liquidation. In a rare appellate decision on the conversion issue, the First Circuit affirmed the finding that the debtor had sold “inventory without replacing it with new inventory or retaining cash sufficient to offset the diminution.” Id. at *3.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s denial of Chapter 15 protection for the U.S. assets of two Cayman Islands hedge funds (the “Funds”) (previously reported in SRZ’s Sept. 19, 2007, Alert, “Cayman Hedge Funds Liquidators’ Request for Chapter 15 Protection Denied by Bankruptcy Court”). See Civ. Case No. 07-8730 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2008) (the “Decision”).
On Dec. 21, 2011, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey approved a liquidation plan for collateralized-debt obligation issuer (“CDO”) Zais Investment Grade Limited VII (“ZING VII”). The plan incorporates a settlement between senior noteholders who had initiated the bankruptcy case by filing an involuntary petition against the CDO, and junior noteholders who were appealing the Bankruptcy Court’s April 26, 2011 order granting the involuntary petition.
As a result of the recent turmoil in the financial markets, a number of clients have asked us questions about counterparty risk. The following is a summary of some of the key issues in dealing with financial counterparties. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code (“Bankruptcy Code”) and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et seq. (“SIPA”) each seek to protect “customer property” in the event of the failure, insolvency or liquidation of a broker-dealer.1 Neither affords customers the certainty of a 100% recovery, however.
Last month, Jeoffrey Burtch (the "Trustee"), as Chapter 7 Trustee for the Opus South Bankruptcy, began filing preference complaints seeking to recover what the Trustee alleges are avoidable transfers under the Bankruptcy Code. For those unfamiliar with the Opus South bankruptcy, the company filed petitions for bankruptcy in the Delaware Bankruptcy Court on April 22, 2009. The Opus South bankruptcy began as a chapter 11 reorganization. However, on August 27, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order converting the case to a chapter 7 liquidation. The Trustee w