Re Finnigan concerned the costs of a successful application to be appointed as liquidators after the liquidators had overlooked a disqualification.
The English High Court in Re Caledonian Ltd considered whether the business practices of two companies justified the winding up of these companies on a just and equitable basis.
Caledonian Ltd and Caledonian Commodities Ltd (Companies) in concert marketed and sold (among other products) carbon credits, rare earth metals and coloured diamonds (Products) to individual investors.
Jellie v Tannenberg Limited concerned an application by the defendant, Tannenberg, to stay liquidation proceedings against it. Tannenberg claimed not to have been served with a copy of the statutory demand or liquidation proceedings. Instead, Tannenberg alleged that it first heard of the liquidation proceedings when they were advertised in the New Zealand Herald. In addition to the issue in respect of service, Tannenberg disputed the underlying debt on which the statutory demand was based.
In our June 2015 update we reported on the Court of Appeal decision in which Mr Gilbert was held personally liable for body corporate levies, as a receiver of QSM Trustees Limited (QSMTL). QSMTL owned units in a unit title complex. The Body Corporate sought to exercise its statutory power and impose levies on Mr Gilbert personally, as receiver of QSMTL.
A High Court finding this month that a liquidator fabricated a key document and failed to account for receipts of over half a million dollars highlights the need for regulation of the insolvency profession.
The case
The liquidator, Geoff Martin Smith, claimed to have sent a notice under section 305 of the Companies Act to the bank holding security over the company in liquidation. The notice required the bank’s election, in default of which its security would be deemed surrendered. The bank said it never received the notice.
The Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal by Steel & Tube Holdings Limited (STH) against the legal basis and quantum of a $750,000 judgment based on a “de facto amalgamation” with its subsidiary company.
The ruling reinforces the message from the High Court that directors must be careful to maintain a subsidiary’s independence if they are to protect the parent against liability for the subsidiary’s debts.
The context
Directors do not need to consider creditors’ interests when determining the fairness of their own remuneration, even after the company has become insolvent, the Court of Appeal has found.
The facts
The Companies Act 1993 requires that directors who vote to authorise director remuneration must sign a certificate stating that, in their opinion, the payment is fair to the company and setting out the grounds for that opinion.
Mr and Ms Moncur were the sole directors and effective owners of Monocrane NZ (Monocrane). Following their separation, they entered into a relationship property agreement under which Mr Moncur assumed full ownership and control of Monocrane, including agreeing to assume sole responsibility for the overdrawn shareholders' current account. In return, Ms Moncur agreed to resign her directorship, transfer her shares to Mr Moncur and pay various joint debts.
The amendment to art. 90(1)(6) of the Insolvency Act 22/2003 (abbrev. LCON) by the Public Sector (Legal Regime) Act 40/2015 was welcomed almost enthusiastically by most market agents. It was felt that the inconsistent treatment bestowed on pledges of future claims (hereinafter, ‘PFC’) would finally be a thing of the past. I myself am not altogether convinced that this is the case, being able to envisage more than one way an insolvency judge, averse to this type of security interests, can dampen the aforementioned enthusiasm by way of a not overly absurd interpretation of the new provision.
Art. 172 IA determines the pronouncements the at-fault classification ruling must contain, judicial pronouncements that constitute true civil penalties.1
Thus, after classifying the insolvency proceedings as at-fault, the people affected by the classification and the accomplices, on whom the orders will fall, have to be determined. Then, arts. 172 and 172 bis IA establish that the judgment must order: