The Supreme Court has recently confirmed that the courts will adopt "a practical business approach (as against one which is unduly technical)" to the determination of due debts when considering a company's ability to pay its due debts.

The case of Hollis & Somerville v Total Debt Solutions (2009) Limited concerned an application by the liquidators of a company for directions that the liquidators could have recourse to all trust monies received by the company to meet their fees and expenses incurred in the liquidation.

Arena Capital Limited (Arena) was a Ponzi scheme.  Arena's liquidators applied under s284(1)(a) of the Companies Act 1993 for directions regarding the distribution of assets under liquidation.

The Court held that dividing the assets into trust assets and general assets was inefficient in the circumstances and ordered a "common pool approach."  The Court ordered distribution on a pro rata, pari passu basis.  The investors had borne the same degree of risk and it was not cost-effective to trace the numerous small contributions.

Ranolf Company Limited (Ranolf) was created for the sole purpose of acting as a trustee of the Ranolf Trust (Trust). This was the only activity Ranolf performed and its only asset was its right of recourse to the Trust assets under indemnity.

Ranolf was put into liquidation in 2014. Earlier this year, Ranolf brought this proceeding in the High Court seeking various orders to enable it to recourse to the Trust property to meet the claims of its creditors and its liquidators' costs.

The director and shareholders of Rayland Investment Ltd (in liq) (the Company) applied to terminate the Company's liquidation. The Court found it appropriate to make that order. At issue, however, was the remuneration claimed by Mr Norrie, the Company's liquidator, which the Court reduced from $39,128 to $15,559.

Mr Norrie was not entitled to remuneration for unnecessary preliminary steps such as consenting to appointment by affidavit and carrying out property searches.

The liquidators of Marathon Imaging Limited (Marathon) brought a claim against the company's director, Mr Greenhill, for a prejudicial disposition of property under section 346 of the Property Law Act 2007 and a breach of director's duties under the Companies Act 1993.  Marathon had begun defaulting on its tax commitments from 2008 onwards and became insolvent shortly after.  The Greenhill Family Trust (Trust), a secured creditor of Marathon, appointed receivers and the Commissioner of Inland Revenue had Marathon placed into liquidation just three days later.

​The Insolvency Working Group's second and final report, released last week, deals with voidable transactions and Ponzi schemes. It proposes a number of changes to the voidable transaction regime, including returning the “gave value" defence to its earlier, more limited, form.

It makes a range of other recommendations across the law of insolvency. Key among them are that the IRD's preferential debt be subject to a limit, and that gift card and voucher holders be treated as preferential creditors.

This question arose in Queensland recently in Linc Energy Ltd (in liq): Longley & Ors v Chief Executive Dept of Environment & Heritage Protection.  The Supreme Court of Queensland found that the liquidators of Linc Energy were not justified in causing the company not to comply with an environmental protection order that required the company to maintain equipment that the liquidators had disclaimed.

Liquidator Mark Norrie has been hit with a second order to pay costs this year in relation to liquidation proceedings. In Norrie v Time3 Global Ltd, the High Court addressed the issue of costs resulting from a quashed order to set aside a transaction made pursuant to s 295 of the Companies Act 1993.

In Kiwi Best Realty Ltd (In Liquidation) v Kashkari, the sole director of a failed real estate business was ordered to pay compensation for breaching his duties under ss 131, 135 and 136 of the Companies Act 1993.

Kiwi Best Realty was liquidated in September 2014, with over $600,000 owing to the IRD. The High Court noted that the company had been balance-sheet insolvent from year end 2012.