As the economy worsens and the value of corporate assets declines, unsecured creditors are finding that very little, if anything, is left for them at the bankruptcy table after the secured creditors have taken as much as they can from a debtor’s assets. Now, after a period of having copious credit available on attractive terms, debtors are going into bankruptcy without sufficient assets to pay even their secured creditors in full. In such circumstances, prospects for unsecured creditors are bleak indeed.
Introduction
The recent ruling by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana in the Chapter 11 case of In re Yellowstone Mountain Club LLC 1 (“Yellowstone”), which found that a senior secured lender had engaged in “overreaching and predatory lending practices”, suggests an application of lender liability theory from today’s perspective to a transaction that took place before the credit crisis.
Introduction
This article addresses bankruptcy issues commonly arising in connection with intercreditor agreements, and is intended to provide a general examination of provisions that relate specifically to bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings. By reviewing variations of these provisions that have appeared in negotiated second lien financings, the discussion provides a checklist that will be useful at the front end of deals of this kind.
Today, the FDIC announced the next steps in further developing the government's Legacy Loan Program (LLP), by testing the LLP program's funding mechanism through the sale of a portfolio of residential mortgage loan receivership assets to a limited liability company (LLC) in exchange for an ownership interest in the LLC.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) announced that Residential Credit Solutions was the winning bidder in a pilot sale of receivership assets conducted to test the funding mechanism for the Legacy Loans Program. The FDIC, as a receiver of Franklin Bank, SSB, owns a portfolio of residential mortgage loans with an unpaid principal balance of approximately $1.3 billion, which the FDIC will convey to a limited liability company. Residential Credit Solutions will pay $64,215,000 in cash for a 50% stake in the limited liability company using 6-to-1 leverage.
On September 17, 2009, the U.S.
In the chapter 11 proceedings for ION Media Networks, a distressed fund (Cyrus) purchased second lien debt and then employed what the Court characterized as "aggressive bankruptcy litigation tactics as a means to gain negotiating leverage." In a November 24, 2009 Memorandum Decision, Judge James Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York stopped Cyrus in its tracks, holding that the Intercreditor Agreement (ICA) between the first lien and second lien lenders would be enforced to deny Cyrus (i) the ability to assert that certain assets were outside of th
Many companies secured their financing several years ago when the credit market featured advantageous pricing and loose loan covenants. Because these favorable terms would be impossible for borrowers to obtain in today’s lending environment, many viable companies with highly leveraged capital structures are looking for strategies to remove debt and, at the same time, to preserve, or “reinstate,” the favorable financing deals they secured before the markets crashed.