The solicitation of creditor votes on a plan is a crucial part of the chapter 11 process. At a minimum, a chapter 11 plan can be confirmed only if at least one class of impaired creditors (or interest holders) votes to accept the plan. A plan proponent’s efforts to solicit an adequate number of plan acceptances, however, may be complicated if creditors or other enfranchised stakeholders neglect (or choose not) to vote.

In a victory for secured creditors, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held inRiver Road Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC), 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011), that a dissenting class of secured lenders cannot be deprived of the right to credit-bid its claims under a chapter 11 plan that proposes an auction sale of the lenders’ collateral free and clear of liens.

Valuation is a critical and indispensable part of the bankruptcy process. How collateral and other estate assets (and even creditor claims) are valued will determine a wide range of issues, from a secured creditor’s right to adequate protection, post-petition interest, or relief from the automatic stay to a proposed chapter 11 plan’s satisfaction of the “best interests” test or whether a “cram-down” plan can be confirmed despite the objections of dissenting creditors.

In a case of first impression, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in In re American Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 637 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2011), held that, for purposes of section 562 of the Bankruptcy Code, a discounted cash flow analysis was a “commercially reasonable determinant” of value for the liquidation of mortgage loans in a repurchase transaction.  

The power to alter the relative priority of claims due to the misconduct of one creditor that causes injury to others is an important tool in the array of remedies available to a bankruptcy court in exercising its broad equitable powers. However, unlike provisions in the Bankruptcy Code that expressly authorize a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP ”) to seek the imposition of equitable remedies, such as lien or transfer avoidance, the statutory authority for equitable subordination—section 510(c)—does not specify exactly who may seek subordination of a claim.

Much attention in the commercial bankruptcy world has been devoted recently to judicial pronouncements concerning whether the practice of senior creditor class “gifting” to junior classes under a chapter 1 1 plan violates the Bankruptcy Code’s “absolute priority rule.” Comparatively little scrutiny, by contrast, has been directed toward significant developments in ongoing controversies in the courts regarding the absolute priority rule outside the realm of senior class gifting— namely, in connection with the “new value” exception to the rule and whether the rule was written out of the Bankr

The strategic importance of classifying claims and interests under a chapter 11 plan is sometimes an invitation for creative machinations designed to muster adequate support for confirmation of the plan. Although the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally states that only “substantially similar” claims or interests can be classified together, it neither defines “substantial similarity” nor requires that all claims or interests fitting the description be classified together.

The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).

The ability of a creditor whose claim is “impaired” to vote on a chapter 11 plan is one of the most important rights conferred on creditors under the Bankruptcy Code. The voting process is an indispensable aspect of safeguards built into the statute designed to ensure that any plan ultimately confirmed by the bankruptcy court meets with the approval of requisite majorities of a debtor’s creditors and shareholders and satisfies certain minimum standards of fairness.

In a ruling that has been described as “very important” and the “first decision of its kind,” bankruptcy judge Shelley C. Chapman of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held on April 1, 2011, in In re Innkeepers USA Trust, 2011 WL 1206173 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.