The power to alter the relative priority of claims due to the misconduct of one creditor that causes injury to others is an important tool in the array of remedies available to a bankruptcy court in exercising its broad equitable powers. However, unlike provisions in the Bankruptcy Code that expressly authorize a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP ”) to seek the imposition of equitable remedies, such as lien or transfer avoidance, the statutory authority for equitable subordination—section 510(c)—does not specify exactly who may seek subordination of a claim.
Much attention in the commercial bankruptcy world has been devoted recently to judicial pronouncements concerning whether the practice of senior creditor class “gifting” to junior classes under a chapter 1 1 plan violates the Bankruptcy Code’s “absolute priority rule.” Comparatively little scrutiny, by contrast, has been directed toward significant developments in ongoing controversies in the courts regarding the absolute priority rule outside the realm of senior class gifting— namely, in connection with the “new value” exception to the rule and whether the rule was written out of the Bankr
The strategic importance of classifying claims and interests under a chapter 11 plan is sometimes an invitation for creative machinations designed to muster adequate support for confirmation of the plan. Although the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally states that only “substantially similar” claims or interests can be classified together, it neither defines “substantial similarity” nor requires that all claims or interests fitting the description be classified together.
The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
The ability of a creditor whose claim is “impaired” to vote on a chapter 11 plan is one of the most important rights conferred on creditors under the Bankruptcy Code. The voting process is an indispensable aspect of safeguards built into the statute designed to ensure that any plan ultimately confirmed by the bankruptcy court meets with the approval of requisite majorities of a debtor’s creditors and shareholders and satisfies certain minimum standards of fairness.
In a ruling that has been described as “very important” and the “first decision of its kind,” bankruptcy judge Shelley C. Chapman of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held on April 1, 2011, in In re Innkeepers USA Trust, 2011 WL 1206173 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
A debtor’s exclusive right to formulate and solicit acceptances for a plan of reorganization during the initial stages of a chapter 11 case is one of the most important benefits conferred under the Bankruptcy Code as a means of facilitating the successful restructuring of an ailing enterprise. By giving a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession time to devise a solution to balance sheet and operational problems without being burdened by the competing agendas of other stakeholders in the bankruptcy case, exclusivity levels the playing field, at least temporarily.
Earlier this year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided in In re Lett that objections to a bankruptcy court’s approval of a cram-down chapter 11 plan on the basis of noncompliance with the “absolute priority rule” may be raised for the first time on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that “[a] bankruptcy court has an independent obligation to ensure that a proposed plan complies with [the] absolute priority rule before ‘cramming’ that plan down upon dissenting creditor classes,” whether or not stakeholders “formally” object on that basis.
Over the past five years, courts have issued rulings of potential concern to buyers of distressed debt. Courts have addressed, among other things, “loan to own” acquisition strategies resulting in vote designation; equitable subordination, disallowance, and other lender liability exposure based upon the claim seller’s misconduct; disclosure requirements for ad hoc committees of debtholders; the adequacy of standardized claims-trading agreements; and claim-filing requirements in the era of computerized records.
When an airline goes bankrupt, do the owner participants in aircraft leverage-lease transactions have a right to recover on monetary claims (worth billions) based on tax indemnification agreements ("TIAs")? The answer lies in the meaning of the words "pay/paid/pays," which had been the subject of conflicting interpretations in the bankruptcy and district courts in the Northwest Airlines and Delta Air Lines bankruptcy cases.