Introduction
On September 17, 2009 Judge Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued two orders that may significantly impact parties who held, or still currently hold, derivative contracts with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (LBSF) or any of the other debtors in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases (the Debtors).
On May 31, 2009, approximately 30 days after Chrysler Group LLC and affiliated debtors filed for bankruptcy relief, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York authorized the sale of substantially all of Chrysler’s assets to “New Chrysler” – an entity formed by Chrysler and Fiat Automobiles SpA and initially majority-owned by Chrysler’s Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary Association (VEBA) – free and clear of liens, claims and encumbrances under section 363 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the Fiat Transaction).
In the recent case of BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA & others [2016] EWHC 1686, the High Court has held for the first time that a dividend can be challenged as a transaction entered into at an undervalue within the meaning of section 423(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “IA”).
The Facts
The facts of the case are long and complex but for present purposes the pertinent facts are as follows.
Arjo Wiggins Appleton Limited (now Windward Prospects Limited) (“AWA”) was a wholly owned subsidiary of Sequana SA (“SSA”).
In a significant Delaware law decision regarding creditors’ ability to sue corporate fiduciaries, the Delaware Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of whether a corporate director owes fiduciary duties to the creditors of a company that is insolvent or in the “zone of insolvency.” In North American Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, the court concluded that directors of a solvent Delaware corporation that is operating in the zone of insolvency owe their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders, and not creditors.
The ability of a creditor whose claim is “impaired” to vote on a chapter 11 plan is one of the most important rights conferred on creditors under the Bankruptcy Code. The voting process is an indispensable aspect of safeguards built into the statute designed to ensure that any plan ultimately confirmed by the bankruptcy court meets with the approval of requisite majorities of a debtor’s creditors and shareholders and satisfies certain minimum standards of fairness.
A debtor’s exclusive right to formulate and solicit acceptances for a plan of reorganization during the initial stages of a chapter 11 case is one of the most important benefits conferred under the Bankruptcy Code as a means of facilitating the successful restructuring of an ailing enterprise. By giving a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession time to devise a solution to balance sheet and operational problems without being burdened by the competing agendas of other stakeholders in the bankruptcy case, exclusivity levels the playing field, at least temporarily.
The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
The early 2000s witnessed a wave of chapter 11 filings by entities with liability for asbestos personal-injury claims. The large number of filings was matched by the variety of legal strategies that companies pursued to address their asbestos liabilities in chapter 11. The chapter 11 case of Quigley Company, Inc. ("Quigley"), was one of the last large asbestos cases to file in the 2000s and represents one of the more interesting strategies for dealing with asbestos liabilities in chapter 11.