Numerous municipalities in California and elsewhere are struggling financially. Indeed, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania and Central Falls, Rhode Island have both recently filed for Chapter 9 protection. State governments may have neither the economic reserves nor the political will to bail out troubled cities and counties. These circumstances have raised the focus on Chapter 9 as a tool for reorganizing municipality debt obligations and has deepened the debate between states and their municipalities about the best strategies for addressing a fiscal crisis.

The District Court for the Southern District of New York recently issued an opinion in Picard v. Katz, et al., (In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC),1 which limits avoidance actions against a debtor-broker’s customers to those arising under federal law based on actual, rather than constructive, fraud. The decision was issued by US District Judge Rakoff in the Trustee’s suit against the owners of the New York Mets (along with certain of their friends, family and associates).

When dealing with a debtor in Chapter 11, vendors typically seek to protect against loss by insisting upon payment in advance or on very short terms. However, the monies paid to a vendor following the filing of bankruptcy often constitute the cash collateral of a secured creditor. It is critical that a vendor determine whether the debtor has authorization to use cash collateral.

NHB Assignments, LLC v. General Atlantic, LLC and Braden Kelly (In re PMTS Liquidating Corp., et al.) Case No. 08-11551 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. July 1, 2011)  

CASE SNAPSHOT

This Installment will address the potential legal disabilities that exist under the New York Debtor and Creditor Law for the Wilpon/Katz families, the owners of the New York Mets (collectively, the “Wilpon Interests”), in their effort to sell a minority interest(s) in the Mets, in light of the existence of the lawsuit against them (the “Wilpon Case”) by Irving Picard, the Trustee in the Bernard L. Madoff bankruptcy.

Fred Wilpon, Saul Katz, and their families and affiliated enterprises (the “Wilpon/Katz Group”) last week formally requested the dismissal of the adversary proceeding commenced by Irving Picard, the trustee of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”). In a two hour hearing before U.S.

Bankruptcy Judge Michael Lynn of the Northern District of Texas recently issued a noteworthy opinion in In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. that addresses two important Chapter 11 confirmation issues. Judge Lynn determined that a plan that artificially impaired a class of claims in order to meet the requirements of section 1129(a)(10) had not been proposed in bad faith and did not violate the requirements of section 1129(a). In his ruling, Judge Lynn also applied the Supreme Court’s cram-down “interest”1 rate teachings in Till v.

The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).

A debtor’s exclusive right to formulate and solicit acceptances for a plan of reorganization during the initial stages of a chapter 11 case is one of the most important benefits conferred under the Bankruptcy Code as a means of facilitating the successful restructuring of an ailing enterprise. By giving a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession time to devise a solution to balance sheet and operational problems without being burdened by the competing agendas of other stakeholders in the bankruptcy case, exclusivity levels the playing field, at least temporarily.

The ability of a creditor whose claim is “impaired” to vote on a chapter 11 plan is one of the most important rights conferred on creditors under the Bankruptcy Code. The voting process is an indispensable aspect of safeguards built into the statute designed to ensure that any plan ultimately confirmed by the bankruptcy court meets with the approval of requisite majorities of a debtor’s creditors and shareholders and satisfies certain minimum standards of fairness.