Puerto Rico is in the midst of a ­financial crisis. Over the past few years, its public debt skyrocketed while its government revenue sharply declined. In order to address its economic problems and to avoid mass public-worker layoffs and cuts in public services, the unincorporated U.S. territory issued billions of dollars in face value of municipal bonds. These bonds were readily saleable to investors in the United States due to their tax-exempt status and comparatively high yields.

In In re Palladino, 942 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2019), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed whether a debtor receives “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for paying his adult child’s college tuition. The Palladino court answered this question in the negative, thereby contributing to the growing circuit split regarding the avoidability of debtors’ college tuition payments for their adult children as constructively fraudulent transfers.

Background

In one of the first decisions issued this year by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the court addressed an issue of first impression. In Mission Products Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, n/k/a Old Cold LLC, No. 16-9016 (1st Cir. Jan. 12, 2018), the First Circuit held that the omission of trademarks from the definition of “intellectual property” in Section 101(35A) of the Bankruptcy Code, as incorporated by Section 365(n), leaves a trademark licensee with nothing more than a claim for damages upon the rejection of its license under Section 365(a).

In Mission Product Holdings Inc. v. Old Cold LLC (In re Old Cold LLC), 879 F.3d 376 (1st Cir. 2018), the First Circuit held that a sale in possible violation of the Supreme Court’s Jevic decision does not allow an appellate court to examine the merits of the sale when the sale-approval order otherwise is statutorily moot under section 363(m).

An Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (“UCC”) often plays an active role in larger, more complex business bankruptcy cases. But what right, if any, does a UCC have to intervene in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding? The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed this very issue in Assured Guaranty Corp., et al. v. The Financial Oversight and Management Board of Puerto Rico, et. al., 17-1831 (1st Cir. Sept. 22, 2017) (“Financial Oversight”) and ultimately held that a UCC does have such a right.

Bankruptcy protection under Section 365 does not give brand owners/debtor-licensors the unilateral right to rescind trademark licensing agreements.

In In re Argon Credit, LLC, 2019 WL 169315 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2019), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that, in accordance with section 510(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, a standby clause in a subordination agreement prevented a subordinated lender from conducting discovery concerning the senior lender’s claims.

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions to creditors in a “structured dismissal” of a bankruptcy case which violate the Bankruptcy Code’s ordinary priority rules without the consent of creditors.

In Assured Guaranty Corp. v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico, 872 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code gave an unsecured creditors’ committee an "unconditional right to intervene," within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1), in an adversary proceeding commenced during the course of a bankruptcy case.

An important aspect of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241 ("PROMESA")—the temporary stay of creditor collection efforts that came into effect upon its enactment—was the subject of a ruling handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. In Peaje Investments LLC v. García-Padilla, 845 F.3d 505 (1st Cir. 2017), the First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part a lower court order denying two motions for relief from the PROMESA stay.