A few reactions to today’s oral arguments before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit regarding the validity of Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act:

The First Circuit Court of Appeals in In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 6768 (1st Cir. Apr. 11, 2014) recently ruled on a number of issues critical to valuing a secured claim in bankruptcy. Specifically, the court 1) endorsed the use of a “flexible approach” to value collateral under the circumstances of this case, 2) recognized that the date collateral should be valued is the lender’s burden to prove, and 3) confirmed that the pre-petition agreement’s default interest rate should generally be used to determine the post-petition interest rate.

The decision provides some additional, though limited protection for licensees of trademarks in bankruptcy proceedings

Introduction

In In re Tempnology LLC,1 the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (the BAP) for the First Circuit provided additional clarity regarding the rights of intellectual property licensees under section 365(n) of the United States Bankruptcy Code,2 particularly with respect to trademark licenses. In Tempnology, the First Circuit BAP concluded that:

Section 365(n) extends only to licenses of "intellectual property" as defined in the Bankruptcy Code,3

On February 7, 2011 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its eagerly awaited opinion in the consolidated appealIn re: DBSD North America, Inc., Docket Nos. 10-1175, 10-1201, 10-1352, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 27007.

Yes, says the First Circuit. The First Circuit recently affirmed the District Court’s decision to deny a group of bondholders’ (the “Bondholders”) motion to have a trustee appointed for the Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “System”) under section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a court to appoint a trustee to pursue avoidance actions in Chapter 9 cases.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the “Second Circuit”) on February 7, 2011 issued an opinion rejecting the often used gifting doctrine in the context of a plan of reorganization on the one hand, while affirming vote designation for claims not purchased in good faith on the other.In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 350480 (2d Cir. Feb. 7, 2011).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s ruling that a mortgagee did not violate the discharge injunction in 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) by sending IRS 1099-A forms to borrowers after their discharge, agreeing that the IRS forms were not objectively coercive attempts to collect a debt.

A copy of the opinion in Bates v. CitiMortgage, Inc. is available at: Link to Opinion.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently rejected a bankruptcy trustee’s effort to avoid a mortgage on the basis that the acknowledgment signed by the borrowers’ attorney-in-fact was defective under Massachusetts law, holding that the acknowledgment was not materially defective because as a matter of agency law the attorney-in-fact’s signature was the borrowers’ “free act and deed.”

Recently, in Gupta v. Quincy Medical Center, 858 F.3d 657 (1st Cir. 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit clarified the limits of the bankruptcy courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction over civil proceedings. The decision, authored by Judge Lipez and joined by retired Supreme Court Justice David Souter (sitting by designation), provides a thorough analysis of the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction in such cases.

Debtors who ignore instructions from the Bankruptcy Court do so at their own peril, as a recent case from the First Circuit Court of Appeals illustrates.