Do Your Duty As You See It: Recent Decisions on Board Duties and Corporate Governance
In previous editions of the Business Restructuring Review, we reported on a pair of highly controversial rulings handed down in late 2005 and early 2006 by the New York bankruptcy court overseeing the chapter 11 cases of embattled energy broker Enron Corporation and its affiliates. In the first, Bankruptcy Judge Arthur J. Gonzalez held that a claim is subject to equitable subordination under section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code even if it is assigned to a third-party transferee who was not involved in any misconduct committed by the original holder of the debt.
The U.S. Supreme Court handed down its first bankruptcy decision of 2013 on May 13. In a unanimous ruling, the court held in Bullock v. BankChampaign N.A., 2013 BL 125909 (U.S. May 13, 2013), that the term “defalcation” for purposes of denying discharge of a debt under section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code includes a “culpable state of mind” requirement involving knowledge of, or gross recklessness with respect to, the improper nature of a fiduciary’s behavior.
Despite the increasing prominence of pre-packaged or pre-negotiated chapter 11 cases in recent years, not every bankruptcy filing by or against a company is a carefully planned event orchestrated over a period of months or even years to achieve a workable reorganization, sale, or liquidation strategy. Sometimes, unanticipated circumstances precipitate a bankruptcy filing.
In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Baldwin (In re Lemington Home for the Aged), 659 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held, among other things, that the “deepening insolvency” cause of action, which the Third Circuit previously recognized in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001), remains an independent cause of action under Pennsylvania law.
Background
The ability of a bankruptcy court to reorder the priority of claims or interests by means of equitable subordination or recharacterization of debt as equity is generally recognized. Even so, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly authorizes only the former of these two remedies. Although common law uniformly acknowledges the power of a court to recast a claim asserted by a creditor as an equity interest in an appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Code is silent upon the availability of the remedy in a bankruptcy case.
As part of an intended comprehensive amendment of German insolvency law, the German Federal Ministry of Justice has prepared a draft of a new law to facilitate the reorganization of enterprises (“Reorganization Facilitation Act”). The new law will curtail the rights of shareholders of insolvent companies and allow capital measures and other corporate measures to be taken in the insolvency of a company without the participation of the shareholders. The new regulation is of interest to investors because it will significantly simplify the purchase of the shares of an insolvent company.
For the third time in as many years, the Delaware Chancery Court has handed down an important ruling interpreting the interaction between federal bankruptcy law and Delaware corporate law. The thorny question this time was whether a bankruptcy court’s determination that the directors of a corporation acted in good faith when they authorized a chapter 11 filing precluded a subsequent claim that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by doing so. The Delaware Chancery Court concluded that it did, ruling in Nelson v.
Principles of corporate governance that determine how a company functions outside of bankruptcy are transformed and in some cases abrogated once the company files for chapter 11 protection, when the debtor's board and management act as a "debtor-in-possession" ("DIP") that bears fiduciary obligations to the chapter 11 estate and all stakeholders involved in the bankruptcy case.