The Eleventh Circuit has made it clear: it will not back down from its decision in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, a decision it issued in 2014 and one which has been the subject of hot debate ever since.In Crawford, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the filing of a proof of claim was an attempt to collect a debt and that the filing of a proof of claim on time barred debt violated the FDCPA. Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014).
For more than a century, courts in England and Wales have refused to recognize or enforce foreign court judgments or proceedings that discharge or compromise debts governed by English law. In accordance with a rule (the "Gibbs Rule") stated in an 1890 decision by the English Court of Appeal, creditors holding debt governed by English law may still sue to recover the full amount of their debts in England even if such debts have been discharged or modified in connection with a non-U.K.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held, in a split decision, on March 22, 2010, that secured creditors do not have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a “cramdown” reorganization plan. In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, et al., --- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 1006647 (3d Cir. March 22, 2010) (2-1).
Overview
In a recent split decision, a 2-1 majority for the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a debtor’s plan of reorganization that proposes a sale of assets free and clear of liens is not necessarily required to allow creditors whose loans are secured by those assets to credit bid at the sale. The majority decision in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, Nos. 09-4266, 09-4349, 2010 WL 1006647 (3d Cir. Mar. 22, 2010), which follows a similar decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (see Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA v.
Welcome to the latest issue of the Section 337 Update. This newsletter is designed to provide you with practical updates and developments on Section 337 proceedings before the US International Trade Commission.
The Collision of Section 337 and the US Bankruptcy Laws
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, applying Connecticut law, has held that coverage under a bankers professional liability policy was precluded by the policy's insolvency exclusion where the underlying claims "arose out of" the bankruptcy of a third-party securities broker or dealer. Associated Community Bancorp, Inc. v. The Travelers Cos., 2010 WL 1416842 (D. Conn. Apr. 8, 2010). The court also held that coverage was barred by the professional services exclusion of the management liability coverage part of the policy.
In Ogle v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 586 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2009), the Second Circuit has now become the second circuit court of appeals to recently conclude that general unsecured creditors may include postpetition attorneys’ fees as part of their claim when attorneys’ fees are permitted by contract or applicable state law.11
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dealt a blow to secured creditors in its recent decision holding that a debtor may prohibit a lender from credit bidding on its collateral in connection with a sale of assets under a plan of reorganization. In the case of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-4266 (3d Cir. Mar. 22, 2010), the court, in a 2-1 decision, determined that a plan that provides secured lenders with the “indubitable equivalent” of their secured interest in an asset is not required to permit credit bidding when that asset is sold.
Many bankruptcy practitioners are familiar with the general tenet that an obligation secured only by a mortgage on the Debtor’s principal residence is immune from modification or avoidance by the Debtor. Sections 1123(b)(5) and 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code protect residential mortgages from being “stripped-down” to the value of the subject real estate or subjecting the terms of the underlying obligation to modification.