In a decision that may create a significant roadblock for companies saddled with environmental clean-up liability to continue as a going concern, the Seventh Circuit in U.S. v. Apex Oil Company, Inc., 579 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2009) affirmed a district court injunction requiring the clean-up of a contaminated site in Illinois under section 7003 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) despite the company's bankruptcy. On September 27, 2010, the Supreme Court is scheduled to discuss whether to grant review of the Apex decision.

In 1984 a Third Circuit panel decided that the automatic stay did not apply to a right to payment which arose under applicable state law after a bankruptcy petition was filed. Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984). The Third Circuit tradition is that the holding of a panel in a precedential opinion is binding on subsequent panels. Until this year Frenville remained good Third Circuit law notwithstanding universal rejection by other circuits.

The Sixth Circuit continues to liberally define the "actual knowledge" required to trigger the 3-year ERISA statute of limitations and, in doing so, affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants in Brown v Owens Corning Investment Review (Case No. 09-3692).

A discovery dispute gave the bankruptcy court an opportunity to rule on the common interest privilege which, the court said, has completely replaced the joint defense privilege for information sharing among clients with different attorneys, citing In re Teleglobe Communications Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 n. 20 (3d Cir. 2007). Leslie Controls, Inc., Case No. 10-12199 (Bankr. D. Del. 9/21/10)(Sontchi, B.J.).

Last week the Supreme Court exercised its option to do nothing about a Seventh Circuit decision allowing the federal government to cram a $150 million remediation obligation onto a chapter 11 successor corporation – all because the feds chose to proceed under RCRA (the federal hazardous waste statute) rather than CERCLA (the Superfund cleanup statute). Smart tactics by the feds.

Bankruptcy Code § 365(d)(3) requires the trustee or the debtor in possession to "timely perform all the obligations of the debtor . . .arising from and after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until such lease is assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section 503(b)(1)." In 2001 the Third Circuit construed this section to require the debtor to perform the lease in accordance with its terms. CenterPoint Properties v. Montgomery Ward Holding Corp. (In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp.), 268 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001).

Deutsche Bank held an under-secured home mortgage from a Chapter 13 debtor. The debtor was in arrears, but wanted to retain possession and control of her home. Thus, in her Chapter 13 plan, the debtor proposed to cure the arrearage, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1322(e). The problem, however, was that the parties could not agree on the arrearage amount.

Commercial lessors have long enjoyed certain individualized protections under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Third Circuit’s recent decision in In re Goody’s Family Clothing, Inc., __ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 2671929 (3d Cir. June 29, 2010), makes it clear that commercial lessors also can take advantage of the more general protections available to creditors to obtain payment for goods and services they provide to a debtor after it files for bankruptcy where the specific protections are not applicable.

Section 365(d)(3)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court recently affirmed a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel that held that a bank which loaned an individual the funds to buy a motor vehicle could not overcome the avoidance of its lien as a preferential transfer after the person filed for bankruptcy. The Court so found because the lien at issue was not perfected under Kentucky law within the time frame necessary to be considered an exception to the avoidance of preferential transfers under the Bankruptcy Code.

In September of this year, the Honorable Mary F. Walrath, the presiding Judge in the DHP Holdings bankruptcy, issued a decision addressing the effect of a forum selection clause when deciding a motion to change venue. This issue came before the court in an adversary action filed by DHP against The Home Depot. After DHP filed for bankruptcy, the company sued Home Depot for $5.5 million alleging Home Depot owed the company for an outstanding account receivable.