On March 20, 2007, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., case docket no. 127 S.Ct. 1199 (2007), that federal bankruptcy law does not preclude an unsecured creditor from obtaining attorney’s fees authorized by a valid prepetition contract and incurred in postpetition litigation. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s ruling in Fobian v. Western Farm Credit Bank (In re Fobian), 951 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir.
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In a case of first impression, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that antidiscrimination laws may be violated when a white employee is fired for having a black spouse. In Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit vacated and remanded a federal district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Iona College (the “College”), finding that triable issues existed as to whether the College’s decision to terminate its employee, Craig Holcomb, was based at least in part upon a racially discriminatory motive.
In Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) and the debtors’ lenders sought approval of a settlement prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization. While the Court concluded that many aspects of the settlement might otherwise be approved, it found that a provision that distributed funds in violation of the absolute priority rule lacked sufficient justification.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware has ruled that a creditor cannot effect a “triangular” setoff of the amounts owed between it and three affiliated debtors, despite pre-petition contracts that expressly contemplated multiparty setoff. In re SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525 (BLS), 2009 WL 68873 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 9, 2009). The Court relied principally on the plain language of section 553(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which limits setoff to mutual obligations between a debtor and a single nondebtor.
In the summer of 2007, we reported on Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. (In re Manhattan Investment Fund, Ltd.),1 decided by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York.
In the well-publicized opinion of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC et al., 599 F. 3d 298 (3rd Cir. 2010), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, agreeing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,1 held that Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code)2 is unambiguous and is to be read in the disjunctive, thus allowing a proponent of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization to use the "cram down" power under subsection (iii) of that Section without allowing a secured creditor to credit bid on a sale proposed as part of the plan.