The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued its decision on a question of first impression before the court: whether section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code applies to administrative claims arising under section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. See, generally, ASM Capital, L.P. v. Ames Dept. Stores, Inc. (In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc.), 582 F.3d 422 (2d Cir. 2009).
The October 15, 2009 decision of the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Pillowtex opens the door for creditors in the Third Circuit to increase their "new value" preference defense under the "subsequent advance" approach.In re Pillowtex, No. 03-12339 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Oct. 15, 2009).
A trustee’s power to avoid preference payments is circumscribed by the statutory defenses set forth in section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. The "subsequent new value" defense set forth in section 547(c)(4) has three well-established elements:
An opinion issued earlier this year by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re SemCrude, L.P., et al. (Bankr. Del., No. 08-11525; January 9, 2009) may end much of the practice of so-called “triangular setoffs” by creditors in bankruptcy cases. The Court in SemCrude found that creditors violate section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code by setting off amounts among multiple debtors, even when exercising contractual assignment rights. This ruling is likely to have far-reaching impact given the dearth of case law on this fairly common contractual provision.
In December, the Sixth Circuit, in Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C. v. Still (In re McKenzie), 737 F.3d 1034 (6th Cir. 2013), addressed two matters of first impression when it adopted the majority rules that (i) a creditor who seeks relief from the bankruptcy automatic stay has the burden to prove the validity of its perfected security interest in collateral; and (ii) the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations on bankruptcy avoidance actions does not prevent the trustee from asserting them defensively under section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.
On November 4, 2010, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois certified the appeal of debtors River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, et al. of the court’s Order Denying Debtors’ Bid Procedures Motion (the Order) entered October 5, 2010. In its Order, the bankruptcy court expressly denied the debtors’ attempts to prevent their secured creditors from credit bidding in a proposed sale of assets under a chapter 11 plan.
Affirming the bankruptcy and district courts below, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2012), held that a debtor could assign insurance policies to an asbestos trust established under section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding anti-assignment provisions in the policies and applicable state law.
Asbestos Trusts in Bankruptcy
In In re River East Plaza, LLC, 669 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2012), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a bankruptcy court's ruling that a debtor could not "cram down" a chapter 11 plan over the objection of an undersecured creditor which had made a section 1111(b) election by substituting a lien on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds as the "indubitable equivalent" of the creditor's mortgage lien on the property.
In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Baldwin (In re Lemington Home for the Aged), 659 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held, among other things, that the “deepening insolvency” cause of action, which the Third Circuit previously recognized in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001), remains an independent cause of action under Pennsylvania law.
Background
Postconfirmation liquidation and litigation trusts have become an important mechanism in a chapter 11 bankruptcy estate’s arsenal, allowing for the resolution of claims and interests without needlessly delaying confirmation in the interim. The specter of postconfirmation litigation may seem unremarkable. Section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code states that a plan may provide for retention or enforcement by the reorganized debtor, the trustee, or a representative of the estate of any claim or interest belonging to the estate.
The ability of a bankruptcy court to reorder the priority of claims or interests by means of equitable subordination or recharacterization of debt as equity is generally recognized. Even so, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly authorizes only the former of these two remedies. Although common law uniformly acknowledges the power of a court to recast a claim asserted by a creditor as an equity interest in an appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Code is silent upon the availability of the remedy in a bankruptcy case.