In a decision with potentially broad implications, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently determined that payments made to former shareholders of a privately held company in a leveraged buyout transaction are protected as "settlement payments" pursuant to section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The October 15, 2009 decision of the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Pillowtex opens the door for creditors in the Third Circuit to increase their "new value" preference defense under the "subsequent advance" approach.In re Pillowtex, No. 03-12339 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Oct. 15, 2009).
A trustee’s power to avoid preference payments is circumscribed by the statutory defenses set forth in section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. The "subsequent new value" defense set forth in section 547(c)(4) has three well-established elements:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held on Nov. 5, 2009, that a creditor was entitled to its post-bankruptcy legal fees incurred on a pre-bankruptcy indemnity agreement. Ogle v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., __F.3d __, No. 09-0691-bk, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24329 (2d Cir. Nov. 5, 2009). Affirming the lower courts, the Second Circuit explained that the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) “interposes no bar . . . to recovery.” Id. at *8-9 (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held on Nov. 3, 2009, that a district court had improperly dismissed, on mootness grounds, an appeal from a bankruptcy court’s order confirming a reorganization plan. According to the Tenth Circuit, the appeal was reviewable because reversal of the plan confirmation order (1) would not unduly affect innocent third parties, and (2) would not undo any complex transactions.
- In re TOUSA, Inc., 408 B.R. 913 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009). Prepetition lenders could not assert third-party claims against the debtors for breach of contract based on loan document representation that debtor borrowers, on a consolidated basis, would be solvent after the financing transaction because such claims did not depend on the outcome of the fraudulent transfer claims of the creditors, which asserted that individual debtor subsidiaries were insolvent.
- In re Metaldyne Corp., 409 B.R. 671 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued its decision on a question of first impression before the court: whether section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code applies to administrative claims arising under section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. See, generally, ASM Capital, L.P. v. Ames Dept. Stores, Inc. (In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc.), 582 F.3d 422 (2d Cir. 2009).
The term “stalking horse” originally referred to a horse or type of screen a hunter used to conceal his position from intended prey. Today the term takes a new meaning altogether thanks to its application in the bankruptcy context. A modern day “stalking horse” is an interested buyer of a debtor’s assets who is offered incentives for being the first to announce its intent. As the initial bidder, the stalking horse sets the minimum purchase price and other terms of the transaction.
A recent decision provides new support for excluding a broad range of severance pay from FICA taxes—a position undercut by the taxpayer’s loss in CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). United States v. Quality Stores Inc., (W.D. Mich., Feb. 23, 2010), affirms a bankruptcy court’s conclusion that, contrary to Revenue Ruling 90-72, 1990-2 C.B.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Feb. 10, 2010, that a corporate debtor’s pre-bankruptcy severance payments to its former chief executive officer (“CEO”) were fraudulent transfers. In re Transtexas Gas Corp., ____ F.3d _____, 2010 BL 28145 (5th Cir. 2/10/10). Because of its holding “that the payments were fraudulent under the Bankruptcy Code,” the court did “not consider other possible violations, including [the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] or [Bankruptcy Code] Section 547(b) [preferences].” Id. at *5.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held on June 23, 2011, that junior creditors could receive a distribution over the objection of senior creditors who claimed they were entitled to post-petition interest under contractual subordination provisions. In re Bank of New England Corporation, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2476470 (1st Cir. June 23, 2011). In reaching its decision, based on the bankruptcy court's fact findings, the court stressed "that the parties did not intend to subordinate the Junior Noteholders to post-petition interest."Id. at *5.