In December, the Sixth Circuit, in Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C. v. Still (In re McKenzie), 737 F.3d 1034 (6th Cir. 2013), addressed two matters of first impression when it adopted the majority rules that (i) a creditor who seeks relief from the bankruptcy automatic stay has the burden to prove the validity of its perfected security interest in collateral; and (ii) the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations on bankruptcy avoidance actions does not prevent the trustee from asserting them defensively under section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On November 4, 2010, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois certified the appeal of debtors River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, et al. of the court’s Order Denying Debtors’ Bid Procedures Motion (the Order) entered October 5, 2010. In its Order, the bankruptcy court expressly denied the debtors’ attempts to prevent their secured creditors from credit bidding in a proposed sale of assets under a chapter 11 plan.

A popular line of thinking among bankruptcy practitioners and commentators holds that substantive consolidation – the combining of assets and liabilities of a debtor and another debtor or non-debtor entity to satisfy creditor claims against both entities ratably from the resulting pool – is an equitable remedy of judicial invention with no specific foundation in the Bankruptcy Code.

Introduction

The Sixth Circuit continues to liberally define the "actual knowledge" required to trigger the 3-year ERISA statute of limitations and, in doing so, affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants in Brown v Owens Corning Investment Review (Case No. 09-3692).

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dealt a blow to secured creditors in its recent decision holding that a debtor may prohibit a lender from credit bidding on its collateral in connection with a sale of assets under a plan of reorganization. In the case of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-4266 (3d Cir. Mar. 22, 2010), the court, in a 2-1 decision, determined that a plan that provides secured lenders with the “indubitable equivalent” of their secured interest in an asset is not required to permit credit bidding when that asset is sold.

In Ogle v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 586 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2009), the Second Circuit has now become the second circuit court of appeals to recently conclude that general unsecured creditors may include postpetition attorneys’ fees as part of their claim when attorneys’ fees are permitted by contract or applicable state law.11

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued its decision on a question of first impression before the court: whether section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code applies to administrative claims arising under section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. See, generally, ASM Capital, L.P. v. Ames Dept. Stores, Inc. (In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc.), 582 F.3d 422 (2d Cir. 2009).

The October 15, 2009 decision of the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Pillowtex opens the door for creditors in the Third Circuit to increase their "new value" preference defense under the "subsequent advance" approach.In re Pillowtex, No. 03-12339 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Oct. 15, 2009).

A trustee’s power to avoid preference payments is circumscribed by the statutory defenses set forth in section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. The "subsequent new value" defense set forth in section 547(c)(4) has three well-established elements:

An opinion issued earlier this year by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re SemCrude, L.P., et al. (Bankr. Del., No. 08-11525; January 9, 2009) may end much of the practice of so-called “triangular setoffs” by creditors in bankruptcy cases. The Court in SemCrude found that creditors violate section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code by setting off amounts among multiple debtors, even when exercising contractual assignment rights. This ruling is likely to have far-reaching impact given the dearth of case law on this fairly common contractual provision.