Directors and officers beware. Former directors and officers of bankrupt companies can now be found liable to pay clean-up costs for contaminated sites in Ontario, even if the contamination occurred before their tenure.
This summer has seen several pension issues making the news. They show how essential it is for employers and trustees to keep abreast of how developments impact on their arrangements.
Jay Doraisamy looks at five areas which have made the headlines this summer:
The High Court has recently considered whether a bankrupt individual of pensionable age can be forced to draw his pension to pay his creditors.
Raithatha v. Williamson [2012] EWHC 909 (Ch)
Background
A bankruptcy order was made against Mr Raithatha on 9 November 2010. Mr Raithatha's trustee in bankruptcy applied for an income payments order (IPO) against Mr Raithatha's pension shortly before he was due to be discharged from bankruptcy. Mr Raithatha was then aged 59 and his pension scheme allowed him to draw a pension from age 55.
The Supreme Court recently considered the scope of the anti-deprivation principle, in Belmont Park Investments PTY Limited (respondent) v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (appellant) [2011] UKSC 38 (Belmont). Understanding the scope of this principle is important for anyone entering a contract where the parties’ rights and obligations change if one of them enters an insolvency procedure. Robert Spedding explains how the courts applied the principle in Belmont and makes some practical suggestions for avoiding problems.
Section 163 gives the trustee the broad power to examine the bankrupt, any person who would be reasonably thought to know the affairs of the bankrupt, or any person who is or has been an agent, clerk, officer, director or employee with respect to the bankrupt or the bankrupt’s dealings. Essentially, this section gives the trustee the power to examine any person who is capable of providing information on the bankrupt.
The Commission is consulting on the application of the current Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. It has provided Member States and other interested parties with a questionnaire, on which it asks for responses by 2 February 2011.
Financial guarantees often contain non-competition clauses. This is mainly to:
- increase the financier’s recoveries from its principal debtor, by stopping the guarantor from draining money from the principal debtor; and
- prevent the guarantor from obstructing a restructuring of the principal debtor’s liabilities.
A recent case suggests these clauses should expressly exclude the “rule in Cherry v. Boultbee”. Zoë Thirlwell and Alexander Hewitt explain.
Counter-indemnity rights
In a corporate reorganization under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”), the design of appropriate classes of creditors can be central to the success of the restructuring initiative. The requisite “double majority” for a plan of arrangement to be approved, being a majority in number and two thirds by value of support from creditors, is required per class in order to be binding on that class.
Courts have broad discretion to grant orders under s. 18.6 of the CCAA in cases where there is no formal Canadian bankruptcy filing.
Magna Entertainment Corp. (“MEC”) is a publicly-traded Delaware corporation with its head office in Ontario. On March 5, 2009, MEC and certain of its U.S. subsidiaries filed for Chapter 11 protection in the United States. Although MEC’s management is based in Canada and MEC has assets in Canada, MEC’s main interests and majority presence are in the U.S.
Section 81.1 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) grants a temporary super priority to suppliers who provided goods to a bankrupt purchaser or where a receiver has been appointed in relation to the purchaser. The section requires the supplier to provide a written demand to the purchaser and allows the supplier to repossess the goods within thirty days of the date of the delivery of goods.