Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bank-ruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on December 8, 2011 issued an opinion on a motion of the Lehman Brothers Inc. (“LBI”) trustee (“Trustee”) to confirm his determination that certain claims relating to settled on delivery-versus-payment “to be announced” (“TBA”) contracts do not qualify as customer claims against the LBI estate and therefore are not entitled to Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”) coverage.

Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes a new non-judicial receivership al-ternative for resolving troubled financial companies that could threaten the stability of the U.S. financial system (“Covered Financial Companies”), as described further below. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), on October 12, 2010, issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (the “Proposal”) to begin to implement the provisions of Title II.

Highlights

A recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals, Sutton v. Pilevsky held that federal bankruptcy law does not preempt state law tortious interference claims against non-debtors who participated in a scheme that caused a debtor—in this case a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity—to breach contractual obligations intended to ensure that the entity remains a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) and to facilitate the lenders’ enforcement of remedies upon a future bankruptcy filing, if any.

Yes, says the First Circuit. The First Circuit recently affirmed the District Court’s decision to deny a group of bondholders’ (the “Bondholders”) motion to have a trustee appointed for the Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “System”) under section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a court to appoint a trustee to pursue avoidance actions in Chapter 9 cases.

Sutton 58 Associates LLC v. Pilevsky et al., is a New York case which gets to the heart of the enforceability of classic single-purpose entity restrictions in commercial real estate lending. At issue is how far a third-party may go to cause a violation of a borrower’s SPE covenants, and whether those covenants are enforceable at all.

A Defaulted Construction Loan and Frustrated Attempts to Foreclose:

UK High Court Confirms Broad Definition of a “Financial Institution” – (Re Olympia Securities Commercial Plc (in administration) [2017] EWHC 2807 (Ch))

The High Court has confirmed it will adopt a broad definition of a “financial institution” for the purposes of the transferability provisions in a loan agreement including: (i) a newly incorporated company with a share capital of £1, (ii) an entity that has not traded and (iii) a special purpose vehicle established for the purpose of acquiring debt.

Facts

Directors and officers (D&Os) of troubled companies should be highly sensitive to D&O insurance policies with Prior Act Exclusion. While policies with such exclusion may be cheaper, a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Eleventh Circuit raises the spectre that a court may hold a loss to have more than a coincidental causal connection with the officer’s conduct pre-policy period and make the (cheaper) coverage worthless.

In Princeton Office Park, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy and district court rulings that the purchaser of a NJ tax sale certificate forfeited its claim and lien because it included the premium it paid to the State when it purchased the tax certificate.

An overvalued property may now have a bigger impact on a secured creditor’s bottom-line during bankruptcy.  Splitting with the Seventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit in Southwest Securities, FSB v.