Turns out, it depends on who you ask. Judge Bernstein said no. Recently, Judge Glenn said yes, but only for causes of action that resemble actual fraudulent transfers. It is unusual for the bankruptcy judges in Manhattan to disagree with each other, so let’s take a look at the issue.

Background

No, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Maxus Energy Corp. In Maxus, the defendant, Vista Analytical Laboratory, Inc. (“Vista” or the “Defendant”), a designated critical vendor, sought summary judgement dismissing the preference complaint. The Court denied summary judgement finding that the critical vendor status did not per se insulate Vista from preference actions.

Background

Yes, says the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit recently held that the Bankruptcy Court has the authority to confirm a chapter 11 plan which contains nonconsensual, third-party releases when such releases are integral to the successful reorganization. The court’s decision in In re Millennium holds that, when the third-party releases are integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship, the Bankruptcy Court has the constitutional authority to approve nonconsensual, third-party releases.

Background

In a decision widely anticipated by investors in emerging market and distressed debt, the Court of Appeal has upheld the decision of the High Court to refuse to grant an indefinite moratorium on claims under certain English law debts under the Cross Border Insolvency Rules (“CBIR”). In doing so, the Court of Appeal has reaffirmed a long-standing principle of English common law that provides important protection to creditors; known as the Rule in Gibbs, the rule provides that a debt may only be discharged according to its own governing law.

In trotting a path out of Chapter 11, debtors in most cases will need to engage various key stakeholders, some of whom are not entitled to a distribution in the bankruptcy. As a form of remuneration, non-debtors may insist on receiving a release of liability - not only from claims belonging to the debtor, but also the claims of third-parties - in exchange for their support and contribution to the case.

Companies that the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) believes may be subject to FDIC receivership under the Orderly Liquidation Authority contained in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, and certain of their affiliates, are now subject to recordkeeping requirements related to their “qualified financial contracts”1 (QFCs).

In a 5-2 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States in Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al. v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust et al., 579 U.S. ___ (2016), rejected the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (the “Recovery Act”) as preempted by the Bankruptcy Code on June 13, 2016. The practical implication of the decision is that Puerto Rico is currently without options to restructure its billions of dollars in municipal debt, and the only feasible path forward will most likely have to come from Congress.

In what appears to be a matter of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently held that payments made to investors in a two tiered securitization structure commonly employed in commercial mortgage-backed securitization (“CMBS”) transactions are largely protected from fraudulent or preferential transfer claims by the securities contract safe harbor set forth in Bankruptcy Code section 546(e). Specifically, in Krol v.

There have been some important recent legal developments that will likely impact acquisition finance. This article will survey some of the more notable ones.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, on May 15, 2012, overturned1 a prior District Court decision stemming from the bankruptcy case of Tousa, Inc., affirming a bankruptcy court’s earlier 2009 decision that had ordered the return, on fraudulent transfer grounds, of over $400 million that had been repaid to prior lenders of the Tousa parent company in connection with a secured financing to the parent and its subsidiaries.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the “Second Circuit”) on February 7, 2011 issued an opinion rejecting the often used gifting doctrine in the context of a plan of reorganization on the one hand, while affirming vote designation for claims not purchased in good faith on the other.In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 350480 (2d Cir. Feb. 7, 2011).