A New Jersey District Court recently addressed several issues in connection with the appointment of a future claims representative (“FCR”). In light of the recent increase in mass-tort bankruptcy cases, exploring these issues is timely.

Background

In the recent decision in Carlos Sevilleja Garcia v Marex Financial Limited,1 the Court of Appeal helpfully summarised the justifications for the English law rule against claims for reflective loss and confirmed that the rule applies equally to unsecured creditors of a company as it does to shareholders.

Highlights

In order to file for bankruptcy, a corporate entity must be legally authorized to do so. Whether the bankruptcy petition has been duly authorized is governed by state law and often depends on the entity’s governance documents. If a petition has not been properly authorized, creditors may seek its dismissal.

The doctrine of substantive consolidation (generally- the power of a bankruptcy court to consolidate the assets and liabilities of affiliated entities in bankruptcy) is a recognized remedy exercised by bankruptcy courts – one that strikes fear into the hearts of many lenders. Justifiably so. The doctrine can be employed to order the substantive consolidation of related-debtor entities in bankruptcy and it can also be employed to substantively consolidate the assets of a debtor in bankruptcy with those of a related entity that is not a debtor in bankruptcy.

Essentially all securitization structures utilize a bankruptcy remote entity, a/k/a special purpose entity (“SPE”), to reduce the lenders’ or investors’ exposure to a bankruptcy of the sponsor. A standard feature of SPEs is the appointment of an independent person (director, member, manager) to the body managing the SPEs. That independent person’s consent is required for “major decisions,” one of which is the filing of, or consenting to a bankruptcy of the SPE (hence the court’s reference to them as “blocking directors”).

Recent legal and regulatory developments have raised issues for those considering a loan-to-own acquisition strategy, and have continued to impact both the structure of highly leveraged financings and the makeup of those willing to provide it.

In re RML  --  Irrational Exuberance?

In its recent decision in Meruelo Maddux Properties, Inc.,¹ the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an entity that meets the definition of a “single real estate” debtor under the Bankruptcy Code may not escape the consequences of such designation simply because it is a subsidiary of a group of companies with integrated and intertwined relationships among them. The decision may provide powerful rights not only to lenders to such entities in general, but could significantly enhance the rights of creditors of real estate owning single purpose entities.

Courts generally agree that pre-petition agreements to forgo the protec-tions of bankruptcy are invalid as against public policy. A recent Tenth Cir-cuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision calls this accepted premise into question by holding that provisions contained in a limited liability company agreement that expressly barred the company, and restricted the manager, from filing a bankruptcy petition were enforceable. DB Capital Holdings, LLC v. Aspen HH Ventures, LLC (In re DB Capital Holdings, LLC), No. 10-046, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir., Dec.

On 12 January 2022, the English High Court granted Smile Telecoms Holdings Limited’s (“Smile” or the “Company”) application to convene a single meeting of plan creditors (the super senior creditors) to vote on the Company’s proposed restructuring plan (the “Restructuring Plan”). It is the first plan to use section 901C(4) of the Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”) to exclude other classes of creditors and shareholders from voting on the Restructuring Plan on the basis that they have no genuine economic interest in the Company. 

Background 

Key Takeaways