In In re City of Vallejo,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California held recently that the City of Vallejo has the authority to reject its collective bargaining agreements with the city’s firefighters and electrical workers as part of its chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding without going through the process detailed in section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court determined that a municipality does not need to comply with the stringent requirements that corporations face when seeking to reject a collective bargaining agreement (a “CBA”).

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware has ruled that a creditor cannot effect a “triangular” setoff of the amounts owed between it and three affiliated debtors, despite pre-petition contracts that expressly contemplated multiparty setoff. In re SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525 (BLS), 2009 WL 68873 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 9, 2009). The Court relied principally on the plain language of section 553(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which limits setoff to mutual obligations between a debtor and a single nondebtor.

I. INTRODUCTION

Bankruptcies and restructurings involving partners and partnerships1 raise a number of unique tax issues. While the IRS has provided guidance with respect to a number of these issues, a surprising number of unresolved issues remain. The first part of this outline summarizes the state of the law with respect to general tax issues that typically arise in connection with partner and partnership bankruptcies and restructurings. The balance of the outline discusses tax issues that arise under Subchapter K when troubled partnerships are reorganized.

Late last year, government responses to the subprime mortgage crisis proliferated but most attention focused on those measures that could be, and in some cases were, rapidly implemented — measures like the Treasury Department’s urging holders of certain subprime adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) to freeze interest rates temporarily or the Federal Reserve’s proposed tightening of lending requirements.

August 31, 2012: Second Circuit Adopts Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review for Equitable Mootness Decisions

The ability to discharge debts (i.e., liability on a claim) is essential to the fundamental goal of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code – providing debtors with a fresh start by resolving all claims that arose before confirmation of the debtor’s plan of reorganization.  In determining the universe of debts eligible for discharge, Third Circuit courts labored for many years underAvellino v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir.

On July 13, 2010, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit unanimously held that auto-parts supplier Visteon Corporation could not terminate health and life insurance benefits for approximately 2,100 retirees during its chapter 11 bankruptcy unless Visteon followed the specific requirements laid out in section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code, even if Visteon would have had the unilateral right to terminate these benefits outside bankruptcy.1 The Court found that a debtor may terminate any retiree benefits in bankruptcy only if,inter alia, the debt

As the economy boomed in 2005-2007 and leverage increased to staggering levels, LBOs took a prominent place in the deal economy. During that time, investors completed 313 LBOs in the United States for approximately $630 billion.1 Following the recent economic downturn, many of those LBOs have become sources of controversy in a number of bankruptcies and restructurings - prominent examples include Tribune Co. and Lyondell Chemical Co.

In Hutson v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.

In ABN Amro Bank N.V. v. Parmalat Finanziara S.p.A. (In re Parmalat Finanziara S.p.A.),1 the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s entry of an injunction pursuant to former section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code (the precursor to current chapter 15, applicable in crossborder insolvency proceedings), which prevented the beneficiary of a guaranty governed by New York law from asserting its guaranty claim against Italian debtor (and guarantor) Parmalat S.p.A. (“Parmalat”) in the United States.