The debtor in Law listed his house on his bankruptcy schedules, claiming a homestead exemption in the amount of $75,000 under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 704.730(a)(1). The debtor represented that the house was encumbered by two liens: a note and deed of trust for $147,156.52 in favor of Washington Mutual Bank, and a second note and deed of trust for $156,929.04 in favor of “Lin’s Mortgage & Associates.” Based on these representations, the debtor made it appear as if there was no nonexempt value in the house that the trustee could realize for the benefit of the estate.

On March 4, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion in Law v. Seigel, Case No. 12-5196, 571 U.S.

Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a bankruptcy trustee to recover transfers from creditors that are labeled “preferences.” To avoid a transfer as a preference, the trustee must generally demonstrate that the transfer: (1) was of an interest of the debtor in property, (2) was made to or for the benefit of a creditor, (3) was made on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor, (4) was made while the debtor was insolvent, (5) was made within 90 days before the petition date (within a year if the creditor was an insider) and (6) enabled the creditor to receive more than the c

It seems that most bankruptcy decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court involve individual debtors, and the Supreme Court’s latest opinion is no exception. Even though the decision is not in a business bankruptcy case, it examines the bankruptcy court’s powers under Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

On March 4, 2014, the Supreme Court decided Law v.

If you have negotiated an intercreditor agreement, you are familiar with the lengthy bankruptcy waivers typically drafted by counsel for first-lien lenders.

Although property obtained by a debtor after filing for bankruptcy is usually safe from creditors, a recent case from the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel allowed a Chapter 7 Trustee to sell real property obtained by the debtors post-petition.

A recent decision in the bankruptcy case of Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al. has called into question a long-held belief that secured creditors hold dear: that debt purchased at a discount can nonetheless be credit bid at its full face amount at a collateral sale. While it remains to be seen how other courts will interpret Fisker, this decision has the potential to restrict participation in Bankruptcy Code section 363 sales and dampen liquidity in the robust secondary markets.

Recently, two courts of appeal dismissed as moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) appeals of orders   authorizing the sale of assets. The courts’ analysis focused on whether granting the appellant’s relief  from the lower courts’ order would affect the asset sale. Thus the trend in the appellate courts is that only appeals that will not affect the sale itself (such as a dispute over the distribution of sale proceeds) are not subject to being dismissed as moot.

In Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, Nos. 12-35238, 12-35319 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2014), the Ninth Circuit held that First Amendment protections under the Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.