The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, on Feb. 21, 2014, affirmed the dismissal of a bankruptcy trustee’s fraudulent transfer complaint against a “warehouse” lender who had been paid by a distressed home mortgage originator several months prior to the originator’s bankruptcy. Gold v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3279 (4th Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (2-1). Affirming the lower courts, the Fourth Circuit held that “the bank accepted the payments” from its borrower “in good faith.” Id., at *2.
The debtor in Law listed his house on his bankruptcy schedules, claiming a homestead exemption in the amount of $75,000 under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 704.730(a)(1). The debtor represented that the house was encumbered by two liens: a note and deed of trust for $147,156.52 in favor of Washington Mutual Bank, and a second note and deed of trust for $156,929.04 in favor of “Lin’s Mortgage & Associates.” Based on these representations, the debtor made it appear as if there was no nonexempt value in the house that the trustee could realize for the benefit of the estate.
On March 4, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion in Law v. Seigel, Case No. 12-5196, 571 U.S.
If you have negotiated an intercreditor agreement, you are familiar with the lengthy bankruptcy waivers typically drafted by counsel for first-lien lenders.
Although property obtained by a debtor after filing for bankruptcy is usually safe from creditors, a recent case from the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel allowed a Chapter 7 Trustee to sell real property obtained by the debtors post-petition.
A recent decision in the bankruptcy case of Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al. has called into question a long-held belief that secured creditors hold dear: that debt purchased at a discount can nonetheless be credit bid at its full face amount at a collateral sale. While it remains to be seen how other courts will interpret Fisker, this decision has the potential to restrict participation in Bankruptcy Code section 363 sales and dampen liquidity in the robust secondary markets.
Recently, two courts of appeal dismissed as moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) appeals of orders authorizing the sale of assets. The courts’ analysis focused on whether granting the appellant’s relief from the lower courts’ order would affect the asset sale. Thus the trend in the appellate courts is that only appeals that will not affect the sale itself (such as a dispute over the distribution of sale proceeds) are not subject to being dismissed as moot.
In Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, Nos. 12-35238, 12-35319 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2014), the Ninth Circuit held that First Amendment protections under the Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
In Jaffé v. Samsung Electronics Co. (In re Qimonda AG), 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1802), the Fourth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s ruling protecting licensees’ rights in connection with the recognition of a German insolvency proceeding. In Jaffe, the foreign debtor’s administrator petitioned the U.S. bankruptcy court for powers under Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Recent rulings in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S.