In In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., 2014 BL 13998 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014), leave to app. denied, 2014 BL 33749 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2014), certification denied, 2014 BL 37766 (D. Del. Feb. 12, 2014), a Delaware bankruptcy court limited a creditor's ability to credit bid its debt in connection with the sale of a hybrid car manufacturer's assets.
In Re: Katherine Elizabeth Barnet, No. 13-612 (2d Cir. Dec. 11, 2013) [click for opinion]
The Eighth Circuit held that preferential payments are subject to a new value defense of § 547(c)(4) where the new value was provided by a third party that benefitted from the preferential transfers.
Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism designed to preserve the creditor/shareholder risk allocation paradigm by categorically subordinating most types of claims asserted against a debtor by equity holders in respect of their equity holdings. However, courts do not always agree on the scope of this provision in undertaking to implement its underlying policy objectives. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this issue in In re Lehman Brothers Inc., 2014 BL 21201 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014).
It is broadly accepted that the abbreviated deadline for a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to assume or reject an unexpired lease of nonresidential real property with respect to which the debtor is the lessee does not apply to executory contracts or unexpired leases of residential real property or personal property.
A recent bankruptcy court decision denying a royalty owner's motion for summary judgment is highly relevant to any investor that currently owns a term royalty interest or is considering such an investment. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas found in NGP Capital Resources Co. v. ATP Oil & Gas Corp. (In re ATP Oil & Gas Corp.), No. 12-3443, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 33 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan.
Much to the chagrin of golf course lenders, bankruptcy and appellate courts around the country have consistently held that a properly-perfected mortgage or security interest in golf course revenues, including cart rentals and green fees, is not sufficient to grant the lender an interest in the golf course’s “cash collateral” if the business ends up in bankruptcy*. The result is that those revenues can be spent by the golf course borrower in the bankruptcy case to cover its administrative or operating expenses over the objection of the lender.
Until recently, the creditor of a chapter 7 debtor whose debts were not primarily consumer in naturewas unable to rely on Eleventh Circuit precedent to support its position that its debtor's chapter 7 bankruptcy case should be dismissed for bad faith.
On March 4, 2014, a unanimous United States Supreme Court decided Law v. Siegel1 and clarified that exercising statutory or inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory authority. Law will likely have broad implications for business bankruptcy cases even though it directly involved the exercise of a bankruptcy judge’s authority under section 105(a) to create a pragmatic solution to the actions of a bad actor in a consumer bankruptcy case.
The Third Circuit held that a supplier may accept court-approved “critical vendor” payments post-petition from a debtor’s bankruptcy estate without fear that such payments will increase that supplier’s liability for payments received pre-petition. Friedman’s Liquidating Trust v. Roth Staffing Cos., 738 F.3d 547 (3d Cir. 2013) (No.