The Eighth Circuit held that preferential payments are subject to a new value defense of § 547(c)(4) where the new value was provided by a third party that benefitted from the preferential transfers.

In Re: Katherine Elizabeth Barnet, No. 13-612 (2d Cir. Dec. 11, 2013) [click for opinion]

In In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., 2014 BL 13998 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014), leave to app. denied, 2014 BL 33749 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2014), certification denied, 2014 BL 37766 (D. Del. Feb. 12, 2014), a Delaware bankruptcy court limited a creditor's ability to credit bid its debt in connection with the sale of a hybrid car manufacturer's assets.

Debt exchanges have long been utilized by distressed companies to address liquidity concerns and to take advantage of beneficial market conditions. A company saddled with burdensome debt obligations, for example, may seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with the same outstanding principal but with borrower-favorable terms, like delayed payment or extended maturation dates (a "Face Value Exchange"). Or the company might seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with a lower face amount, motivated by discounted trading values for the existing notes (a "Fair Value Exchange").

ARTICLE 9 AND THE LIFE OF A UCC FINANCING STATEMENT

In its first bankruptcy decision of 2014 (October Term, 2013), the U.S. Supreme Court held on March 4, 2014, in Law v. Siegel, No. 12-5196 (Mar. 4, 2014) (available athttp://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-5196_8mjp.pdf), that a bankruptcy court cannot impose a surcharge on exempt property due to a chapter 7 debtor's misconduct, acknowledging that the Supreme Court's decision may create "inequitable results" for trustees and creditors.

Without question, the bedrock of bankruptcy, particularly a successful one, is consent. Indeed, the notion of consent is threaded throughout the Bankruptcy Code and related law in respect of diverse issues ranging from the authority of the bankruptcy court to preside over certain matters, to confirmation of plans of reorganization.

Under section 502(b)(6) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, a landlord's claim for damages under a lease rejected during the bankruptcy proceeding is capped at the greater of rent reserved under the lease for (a) one year; or (b) 15% or the remaining lease term, not to exceed three years. Under that calculation, a lease with a remaining term of 81 months or more would be entitled to claim greater than one year's rent.

Until recently, the creditor of a chapter 7 debtor whose debts were not primarily consumer in naturewas unable to rely on Eleventh Circuit precedent to support its position that its debtor's chapter 7 bankruptcy case should be dismissed for bad faith.

Much to the chagrin of golf course lenders, bankruptcy and appellate courts around the country have consistently held that a properly-perfected mortgage or security interest in golf course revenues, including cart rentals and green fees, is not sufficient to grant the lender an interest in the golf course’s “cash collateral” if the business ends up in bankruptcy*. The result is that those revenues can be spent by the golf course borrower in the bankruptcy case to cover its administrative or operating expenses over the objection of the lender.