New value is an important defense to preference liability under the Bankruptcy Code. It allows a preference defendant to relieve their preference liability on a dollar-for-dollar basis for the value provided to the debtor prior to the bankruptcy case.

In a very important decision, the Eighth Circuit recently addressed how the new value defense to preference liability should be applied in three-party payment arrangement.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered the question of how much protection is required for a secured creditor to be adequately protected. Banker’s Bank of Kansas, N.A. v. Bluejay Properties, LLC (In re Bluejay Properties, LLC), Bankr. No. 12-22680 (10th Cir. Mar. 12, 2014)(unpublished).

Unlike real estate transactions where a lender can obtain title insurance, secured lenders are often relying upon the representations and warranties in their loan agreement and the borrower’s audited financial statements, if and when determining whether the collateral securing their loans is owned by the borrower or another pledgor.  After default, a lender may find itself in a precarious position whereby it is unable to foreclose on the collateral because it is not owned by its borrower and it does not have a pledge from the person that actually does own the property.  According

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on March 19, 2014, held that a corrupt debtor’s pre-bankruptcy cash transfer to a commodity broker was a “settlement payment” made “in connection with a securities contract,” thus falling “within [Bankruptcy Code] §546(e)’s safe harbor” and insulating the transfer from the trustee’s preference claim. Grede v. FCStone, LLC (In re Sentinel Management Group, Inc.), 2014 WL 1041736, *7 (7th Cir. Mar. 19, 2014).

The Ninth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) recently upheld the disallowance of a credit union’s claims after the credit union’s “disgruntled employee” failed to file the proofs of claim before the claims bar date. 

The case of Spokane Law Enforcement Federal Credit Union v. Barker (In re Barker) serves as a cautionary tale—reminding creditors and their attorneys of the importance of timely filing proofs of claim.  

The Bankruptcy Code has approximately 275 different sections. The number of its subsections and subparagraphs is well into the thousands. It is impossible to select the “most significant” provision in the Bankruptcy Code, but among the candidates for that title is certainly § 105 of the Code.

Under section 502(b)(6) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, a landlord's claim for damages under a lease rejected during the bankruptcy proceeding is capped at the greater of rent reserved under the lease for (a) one year; or (b) 15% or the remaining lease term, not to exceed three years. Under that calculation, a lease with a remaining term of 81 months or more would be entitled to claim greater than one year's rent.

Without question, the bedrock of bankruptcy, particularly a successful one, is consent. Indeed, the notion of consent is threaded throughout the Bankruptcy Code and related law in respect of diverse issues ranging from the authority of the bankruptcy court to preside over certain matters, to confirmation of plans of reorganization.

In its first bankruptcy decision of 2014 (October Term, 2013), the U.S. Supreme Court held on March 4, 2014, in Law v. Siegel, No. 12-5196 (Mar. 4, 2014) (available athttp://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-5196_8mjp.pdf), that a bankruptcy court cannot impose a surcharge on exempt property due to a chapter 7 debtor's misconduct, acknowledging that the Supreme Court's decision may create "inequitable results" for trustees and creditors.

ARTICLE 9 AND THE LIFE OF A UCC FINANCING STATEMENT