The Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that a debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lender had breached its financing agreement, barring its claim for commitment and funding fees from the DIP. Arlington LF, LLC v. Arlington Hospitality, Inc., No. 09-3560, 2011 WL 727981, *9 (7th Cir. March 3, 2011), aff’g No. 08 C 5098, 2011 WL 3055350 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009). Although the DIP itself had also breached the agreement, that breach was not, in the court’s view, effective until after the lender had already “walked away.” Id. at *6.
Introduction
Vendors who sell goods to customers are probably familiar with the issues that arise when the customer later files bankruptcy.
Recently, several courts have added to the growing body of decisions construing intercreditor agreements in bankruptcy cases.
A popular line of thinking among bankruptcy practitioners and commentators holds that substantive consolidation – the combining of assets and liabilities of a debtor and another debtor or non-debtor entity to satisfy creditor claims against both entities ratably from the resulting pool – is an equitable remedy of judicial invention with no specific foundation in the Bankruptcy Code.
Reorganization or debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) financing has become an increasing source of litigation.
The term “frenemy” – a combination of the words friend and enemy – has emerged from modern vernacular to describe someone who is simultaneously a partner and an adversary. The term is perhaps perfectly emblematic of the restructuring process where various constituents make and break alliances in an effort to steer the restructuring process. In so doing, the lines between friend and enemy are often blurred or altered during the course of the restructuring.
In yet another attack on Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California has refused to allow the assignee of a deed of trust (DOT) to regain possession of a home on which it had foreclosed where the assignment had not been recorded.
STAMAT v. NEARY (March 24, 2011)
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky recently found that a vendor’s filing of a prepetition notice of lis pendens served to place any hypothetical judicial lien creditor, execution creditor, or purchaser of real property on notice of its equitable lien against the property for the unpaid portion of the purchase price. This prepetition notice of lis pendens prevented the debtors-in-possession from avoiding the vendor’s lien in exercise of their strong-arm powers under 11 U.S.C. § 544.