On May 5, 2009, Judge James Peck, the Bankruptcy Judge in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases, held that the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not override the mutuality requirements for setoff under section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. As a consequence, the Bankruptcy Court prohibited Swedbank, a non-debtor counter party to a swap agreement, from setting off pre-petition claims against Lehman against funds collected for Lehman’s account postpetition. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Bankr. Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware has ruled that a creditor cannot effect a “triangular” setoff of the amounts owed between it and three affiliated debtors, despite pre-petition contracts that expressly contemplated multiparty setoff. In re SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525 (BLS), 2009 WL 68873 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 9, 2009). The Court relied principally on the plain language of section 553(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which limits setoff to mutual obligations between a debtor and a single nondebtor.
March 9, 2012: Publication of Dynegy Examiner’s Report
Despite the prevalence of first-lien/secondlien structures in the loan market over the course of the recently-ended leveraged transaction cycle, fully-litigated cases interpreting the provisions of first-lien/second-lien intercreditor agreements remain something of a rarity. As a result, cases providing guidance on the extent to which customary waivers included in such intercreditor agreements would be enforced are always welcomed by finance practitioners. It comes as no surprise then, that the decision of Judge Peck of the U.S.
In Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v.Knupfer (In re PW, LLC),1 the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit (the “BAP”) addressed the issue of whether a secured creditor had purchased estate property free and clear of liens, claims and encumbrances outside of a plan of reorganization.
I. Summary
Introduction
In Aalfs v. Wirum (In re Straightline Investments, Inc.),1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether a post-petition factoring of accounts receivable by the debtor was an avoidable transfer under section 549 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Bankruptcy Court, finding that the post-petition transfer had been properly avoided and that the lower court was justified in allowing the trustee both to recover the accounts receivable and their proceeds and to retain the consideration paid by the transferee.
The ability to discharge debts (i.e., liability on a claim) is essential to the fundamental goal of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code – providing debtors with a fresh start by resolving all claims that arose before confirmation of the debtor’s plan of reorganization. In determining the universe of debts eligible for discharge, Third Circuit courts labored for many years underAvellino v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir.
A creditor’s ability to vote on a plan of reorganization is one of its most fundamental rights in a chapter 11 bankruptcy. For strategic investors in distressed debt, the power to vote—and potentially control a voting class (or obtain a blocking position in that class)— can be a critical tool in maximizing value and return on investment. Investors should be aware, however, that a recent decision by Judge Robert E.