Summary

On 24 July 2013, the Supreme Court handed down its long-awaited judgment in the Nortel/Lehman case: Re Nortel Companies [2013] UKSC 52. The Court looked at the position where a contribution notice (CN) or financial support direction (FSD) was issued by the Pensions Regulator (TPR) on a company that is already in insolvency proceedings in England (eg administration). How does the relevant obligation rank in the order of priority of payment?

A company went into administration and company voluntary arrangements were entered into to effect a rescue of viable parts of the group. As part of that process, a valuation of the liabilities of the companies as at 1 October 2001 was required. They included claims arising under section 75 of the Pensions Act 1995. However, those debts were not triggered until July 2004 and the scheme actuary for did not sign the section 75 certificates and apportion shares amongst the various companies until March 2006.

Snapshot

The Supreme Court handed down its long-awaited judgment today in the Nortel/Lehman case on where a contribution notice (CN) or financial support direction (FSD) issued by the Pensions Regulator (TPR) on a company that is already in insolvency proceedings (eg administration) ranks in the order of priority of payment.

Summary

The Court of Appeal decision in the Nortel case upheld the High Court ruling that FSD/CN liability is an expense of the administration and therefore ranks ahead of administrators' remuneration, floating charges and unsecured creditors. Much of the press coverage which has followed in the immediate aftermath seems to have assumed that the decision is a victory for "good" pensioners over the "bad" banks.

Background to Re Permacell

A section 75 debt is a debt due from an employer in a multi-employer defined benefit pension scheme to the trustees of the scheme.

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Background