The devastating consequences of an enduring global recession for businesses and individuals alike have been writ large in headlines worldwide, as governments around the globe scramble to implement assistance programs designed to jumpstart stalled economies. Less visible amid the carnage wrought among the financial institutions, automakers, airlines, retailers, newspapers, homebuilders, homeowners, and suddenly laid-off workers is the plight of the nation's cities, towns, and other municipalities.

Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C § 101 et seq., which incorporates most of the provisions of the United Nations’ Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency,[1] was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. Chapter 15 replaced former 11 U.S.C. § 304, which was been enacted in 1978 to provide specific procedures by which a representative in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding could obtain relief in U.S. courts to facilitate the foreign bankruptcy proceeding.

A recent opinion from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit confirms that “actual control” over a debtor is not necessary to qualify as a nonstatutory “insider” for the purpose of extending the period for preference recovery under Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. See Schubert v. Lucent Technologies, Inc. (In re Winstar Communications, Inc.), 554 F.3d 382 (3rd Cir. 2009).

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently issued a decision addressing triangular set-off provisions, which potentially has very far-reaching implications for the enforceability of contractual set-off rights under U.S. law.

Companies that engage in multiple transactions with different entities of related groups often enter into contractual netting agreements that allow the setoff of obligations between entities within the groups. The effectiveness of these agreements has been called into question by a recent decision of a bankruptcy court in Delaware, which refused to allow a party to a contractual netting agreement to offset its obligations to the debtors against obligations of the debtors under the netting agreement.

Debt-for-debt exchanges are not new, but are worth revisiting given the current economic climate. Furthermore, the recently enacted "Stimulus Act"1 provides some temporary relief to debtors from potentially harsh tax consequences of restructuring. The following discussion is relevant to issuers (also referred to as debtors) or holders (also referred to as creditors) of debt who are "US persons" (as defined in the US Internal Revenue Code).2

In order to illustrate some of the key US federal income tax consequences of a debt-for-debt exchange, consider the following example:

After a relatively brief and checkered stint in Delaware courts, it appears that the cause of action against corporate directors for “deepening insolvency” may have lost its place in Delaware corporate jurisprudence.

C.A. No. 4499-VCL (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2009) (Lamb, V.C.) (Letter opinion).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has affirmed a lower court ruling that lease termination fees can be considered preferential transfers under the Bankruptcy Code, subject to avoidance. The court’s holding reinforces concerns over whether landlords can structure lease terminations in a manner that protects them from preference recovery.

Yesterday, in a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, General Motors announced that it is currently attempting to restructure debt held by the U.S. Treasury Department. Under a current proposal, GM would convert at least 50% of its debt held by the U.S. Treasury Department into common shares. As a result of the conversion Treasury would hold greater than 50% of GM’s common shares.