Boards of directors of troubled companies must balance their fiduciary obligations to shareholders and creditors. Insolvent companies owe duties to creditors and not solely to shareholders and, under evolving case law, companies acting in the "zone of insolvency" owe a duty to creditors as well as to shareholders.

The rapid growth in derivatives as hedging instruments, particularly through equity swaps, credit default swaps ("CDS") and loan credit default swaps ("LCDS"), has challenged fundamental assumptions underlying corporate governance law, federal shareholder disclosure requirements and bankruptcy law. Corporate law has long relied on a "one share one vote" model, which presumes that a shareholder's economic interests in a corporation are inextricably linked to their voting power.

Given the state of the economy, it will not be a rare occurrence in the short term for a supplier to receive a request to sell and deliver further goods to a purchaser who has filed proceedings under the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) or Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code — and who is already indebted for unpaid pre-filing sales.

Introduction

On April 9, 2008, in the M. Fabrikant & Sons, Inc. bankruptcy case pending in the Southern District of New York, Chief Judge Stuart M. Bernstein held that a seller of bank debt under the standard LSTA claims transfer documents transfers all of its rights except for those explicitly retained, including unmatured contingent claims, thus giving broad construction to the term “Transferred Rights” under the standard LSTA trade documents.

In a recent case,1 the Fifth Circuit emphasized its rule that a creditor's claim may be equitably subordinated to the claims of other creditors only to the extent necessary to offset the harm that the other creditors have suffered, based on specific findings and conclusions.

Background

For the third time in as many years, the Delaware Chancery Court has handed down an important ruling interpreting the interaction between federal bankruptcy law and Delaware corporate law. The thorny question this time was whether a bankruptcy court’s determination that the directors of a corporation acted in good faith when they authorized a chapter 11 filing precluded a subsequent claim that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by doing so. The Delaware Chancery Court concluded that it did, ruling in Nelson v.

Participants in the multibillion-dollar market for distressed claims and securities had ample reason to keep a watchful eye on developments in the bankruptcy courts during each of the last three years. Controversial rulings handed down in 2005 and 2006 by the bankruptcy court overseeing the chapter 11 cases of failed energy broker Enron Corporation and its affiliates had traders scrambling for cover due to the potential that acquired claims/debt could be equitably subordinated or even disallowed, based upon the seller’s misconduct.

In In re Falcon Products, Inc., 381 B.R. 543 (8th Cir. BAP, 2008), the bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) for the Eighth Circuit reversed a decision by the bankruptcy court for the District of Missouri, and held that when applying the hypothetical liquidation test to determine whether a secured creditor received potentially preferential payments, the collateral must be valued as of the petition date and not as of the payment transfer date.

On July 22, 2008, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed denial of the motion of Parmalat S.p.A. ("New Parmalat") to extend an injunction provided to its predecessor, Parmalat Finanziaria, S.p.A., under Bankruptcy Code section 304, against securities fraud actions.1 Although the appeal addressed the issue of injunction in the context of superseded Bankruptcy Code section 304, this decision and the underlying lower court opinion signify other issues of broader import, including the need for careful plan drafting and the complexities inherent in cross-border cases.