In Aalfs v. Wirum (In re Straightline Investments, Inc.),1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether a post-petition factoring of accounts receivable by the debtor was an avoidable transfer under section 549 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Bankruptcy Court, finding that the post-petition transfer had been properly avoided and that the lower court was justified in allowing the trustee both to recover the accounts receivable and their proceeds and to retain the consideration paid by the transferee.

In In re Bryan Road LLC,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida considered whether a waiver of the automatic stay provision included in a prepetition workout agreement is enforceable in the debtor’s subsequent bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court enforced the waiver and held the creditor was not bound by the automatic stay after engaging in a four-factor analysis of the agreement and the circumstances surrounding its execution. The Bankruptcy Court cautioned, however, that relief from stay provisions are neither per se enforceable nor self-executing.

In Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Phar-Mor, Inc.,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a lessor-claimant whose lease was rejected pursuant to section 365(a) of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code was entitled to a claim for future-rent damages against the debtor, even though the lessor had entered into a nearly identical substitute lease. The Court concluded that efforts to mitigate damages by the lessor would not be considered in reducing the actual damage claim when those efforts failed to reduce the actual harm suffered by the lessor.

Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that claims for “damages arising from the purchase or sale of . . . a security” of the debtor or an affiliate of the debtor are subordinated to any claims not based on stock. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b). Because there is rarely enough value in a bankrupt company to satisfy all claims, a determination that a particular claim is subject to mandatory subordination under section 510(b) means that, as a practical matter, the claim is unlikely to receive any distribution from the estate.

Where the entirety of a debt is not included in an agreement to settle, a creditor can continue to prove in a bankruptcy for the balance.

The absence of an intention to put assets out of the reach of creditors will thwart applications under the Insolvency Act to set declarations of trust or transfers aside.

The court will not always set aside a property transfer order in matrimonial proceedings where the party transferring the property, as part of a clean break order, becomes bankrupt shortly afterwards, and there are allegations of lack of consideration or transfer at an undervalue.

An agreement to pay off part of a judgment debt owed jointly with others will not of itself amount to consideration sufficient to prevent a creditor going against a debtor for the unpaid balance of the judgment.

A husband and wife jointly owned their property. In matrimonial proceedings, the husband was ordered to transfer his interest in the property to the wife. Following his bankruptcy, the husband’s trustee applied to set aside the property transfer on the basis that it had been made at an undervalue, and the wife had given no consideration in money or money’s worth within the meaning of s339 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The wife contended that the fact that she had foregone ancillary relief claims was capable of amounting to consideration.

MB had been the secured tenant of a property in which she lived with B, and which she had bought at a substantial discount. The property was conveyed into the joint names of MB and B as joint tenants. Although MB’s mortgage company had insisted the property be in joint names, she claimed that the intention had always been that B would only have a minimal interest in it. He had made no contribution to the purchase price, mortgage repayments or household expenses. When MB had ascertained the effect of the joint tenancy, she gave notice of severance to B.