Looking back at the last few months, the COVID-19 pandemic has hit many companies hard and amplified disruptive trends in various sectors. In addition to other measures to address COVID-19 impact on businesses, Germany has made significant progress toward international best practices for restructuring: StaRUG — known as the German scheme — came into effect on 1 January 2021, as one of the most modern restructuring laws in the world. But how will StaRUG help German companies survive the crisis and what if insolvency is unavoidable?

Accountability is the major theme of the recent government consultation regarding ‘Insolvency and Corporate Governance’, which follows high profile failures such as BHS and Carillion. The consultation contains proposals relating to four main areas as set out below.

Sales of businesses in distress

The proposal represents a significant extension of the current duties owed by directors. Under the proposal, a director of a parent company may be held liable for losses following a sale of a subsidiary if:

A recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation,¹ represents a significant victory for shareholders who may get cashed out in connection with a leveraged transaction that precedes a company bankruptcy.

Industry observers have been waiting to see when bank failures arising out of the recent financial crisis would produce a wave of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) litigation similar to that seen in the early 1990s after the savings and loan crisis. With its second suit in recent months, the FDIC has shown that it will aggressively pursue claims against directors and officers in connection with failed depository institutions.

On 12 January 2022, the English High Court granted Smile Telecoms Holdings Limited’s (“Smile” or the “Company”) application to convene a single meeting of plan creditors (the super senior creditors) to vote on the Company’s proposed restructuring plan (the “Restructuring Plan”). It is the first plan to use section 901C(4) of the Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”) to exclude other classes of creditors and shareholders from voting on the Restructuring Plan on the basis that they have no genuine economic interest in the Company. 

Background 

Key Takeaways

Merit Management

Equitable mootness is a judicially created doctrine often applied in appeals from orders of bankruptcy courts confirming chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In instances where granting relief on appeal would result in overturning the confirmation order and therefore unravelling a substantially consummated chapter 11 plan, appellate courts have, in certain circumstances, abstained from deciding appeals in reliance on equitable mootness.

Shareholder of a Korean corporation (“Cuzco Korea”), the sole member of a chapter 11 limited liability company debtor (“Cuzco USA” or the “Debtor”), brought an adversary proceeding against the Debtor and others, asserting claims directly, derivatively on behalf of Cuzco Korea and “double derivatively” on behalf of the Debtor. On the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the bankruptcy court for the district of Hawaii was required to consider the impact of Korean law on the derivative claims as well as notions of forum non conveniens.

In the recent decision in Carlos Sevilleja Garcia v Marex Financial Limited,1 the Court of Appeal helpfully summarised the justifications for the English law rule against claims for reflective loss and confirmed that the rule applies equally to unsecured creditors of a company as it does to shareholders.

Highlights