On November 13, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and its U.S. affiliates in bankruptcy, including Lehman Brothers Special Financing and Lehman Brothers Commercial Paper (collectively, “Lehman”) filed a motion asking that certain expedited procedures be put in place to allow Lehman to assume, assign or terminate the thousands of executory derivative contracts to which they are a party.
The bankruptcy court overseeing the Lehman Brothers chapter 11 cases rejected efforts by Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (LBSF) to recover roughly $1 billion in payments made to numerous noteholder defendants from the liquidation of collateral originally pledged to secure both obligations under notes issued by special purpose entities and credit default swap (CDS) obligations to LBSF, holding that the termination of the swap and liquidation and distribution of the collateral were protected by the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor.
A federal judge in New York – the Hon. Richard J. Sullivan – mostly granted JP Morgan Chase Bank’s motion to dismiss claims brought on behalf of unsecured creditors of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. related to JPM’s requirement that Lehman Brothers Inc., LBH’s broker-dealer subsidiary, pledge and post extra collateral in September 2008, shortly before LBI filed for bankruptcy protection on September 15, 2008.
On May 29, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, resolved a high-profile circuit split regarding the right of secured creditors to credit bid in an asset sale under a chapter 11 plan. In RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,1 the Court held that a debtor cannot deny a secured creditor the right to credit bid as part of a chapter 11 plan providing for the sale of assets free and clear of the secured creditor’s liens on those assets.
On March 20, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) proposed a rule (Proposed Rule), with request for comments, that implements section 210(c)(16) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act or the Act) , which permits the FDIC, as receiver for a financial company whose failure would pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States (a covered financial company), to enforce contracts of subsidiaries or affiliates of the covered financial company despite contract clauses that purport to terminate, accelerate, or provide
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the Court), has held that section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a swap counterparty from setting off amounts owed to the debtor against amounts owed by the debtor to affiliates of the counterparty, notwithstanding the safe harbor provision in section 561 of the Bankruptcy Code and language in the ISDA Master Agreement permitting the swap counterparty to effect “triangular” setoffs. In re Lehman Brothers Inc., Case No. 08-01420 (JMP)(SIPA) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. October 4, 2011).
In re Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VII1 is the latest in a recent line of bankruptcy cases challenging bedrock assumptions regarding securitization special purpose entities (SPEs) and bankruptcy considerations in securitization transactions.2 Zais establishes precedent allowing a senior noteholder of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) to place the CDO issuer in an involuntary chapter 11 bankruptcy in order to advance an asset management plan that would otherwise require supermajority approval of all noteholders (including all junior classes) under the related indenture.
The scenario has become all too familiar in recent years: a borrower defaults on a loan and, when the lender pursues the loan collateral through foreclosure or other proceedings, the borrower files for bankruptcy protection. More often than not, when the lender appears in bankruptcy court to pursue its interest in the collateral, the borrower counterattacks with a host of state law lender liability claims.
In In re Zair, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49032 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2016), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York became the latest to take sides on the emerging issue of “forced vesting” through a chapter 13 plan. After analyzing Bankruptcy Code §§ 1322(b)(9) and 1325(a)(5), the court concluded that a chapter 13 debtor could not, through a chapter 13 plan, force a mortgagee to take title to the mortgage collateral.
Background
In AMR Corporation, et al., Debtors, Case No. 12-3967, 2013 WL 1339123 (S.D.N.Y. April 3, 2013), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York acknowledged that to be granted relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), a secured creditor has the initial burden to show that there has been a decline—or at least a risk of decline—in the value of its collateral. Only then will the burden shift to the debtor to prove that the value of the collateral is not, in fact, declining.