Summary: Last year, a developer client raised concerns about the solvency of its main contractor, Carillion. With over 50% of the works still to be completed, the client wanted some advice as to how it could manage the risks (legally and practically) if the contractor did go “pop”. In January this year, the concerns became a reality. This blog addresses these key questions and what followed in the wake of Carillion’s demise.

Cease payment?

In early 2017 we reported that following various scandals affecting business in the UK, the Government had made it clear that it intended to crack down on unacceptable boardroom behaviour.

A report published by the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee suggested that the existing law governing corporate governance did not require revision. However, the Committee recommended a number of measures including a voluntary code of corporate governance for large private companies.

In the wake of the Carillion insolvency and the Toys R Us administration, there are contrasting tales from two different UK businesses.

The engineering business Rolls-Royce is going against the trend and has announced that it will keep its defined benefits pension scheme open for current members until January 2024.

The scheme is running at a £1.4 billion surplus, which will also allow the company to decrease its contributions to its defined benefit retirement fund by £145 million over the next three years.

It is no great surprise that following the collapse of Carillion and with other retail businesses teetering on the edge, insolvency and corporate recovery is back in the news.

Some of the biggest casualties of entities like Carillion are the employees. Luckily, in the Carillion failure many jobs have been saved, but there is still a residual cost to employees who have to submit claims to the National Insurance Fund and the liquidator to recover payments for unpaid wages, holiday and sick pay.

​We consider the implications of the Work and Pensions and BEIS Committees’ report into Carillion, which highlights a lack of “meaningful competition” in the statutory audit market and recommends a reference to the Competition and Markets Authority.

Summary

Claims remain frequent in the construction industry, and so do insolvencies. In the wake of main contractor Carillion’s entry into liquidation, and rumours of forthcoming interest rate rises, it is worth looking at what effect different types of insolvency have on the ability to prosecute claims.

In the last week we have seen MPs criticise accountancy firms, KPMG, Deloitte, EY and PWC in their first report on the collapse of Carillion, describing the big four as “a cosy club” and calling for the firms to be forcibly broken up. Whilst not suggesting that the firms were to blame for the collapse, it is the level of fees reportedly paid to the firms which caught the MPs attention– £72 million in 10 years.

Carillion, the UK’s second largest construction company, entered compulsory liquidation on 15 January 2018, with estimated debts of £1.5bn and a pension deficient of c£800m, following three profit warnings in 2017. The company employs 20,000 people in the UK and 43,000 people worldwide. It is thought that some 30,000 companies may be affected by the liquidation.

With so much news coverage, it is difficult to ignore the ‘Carillion effect’. It’s hard to see how anything good can have come from Carillion’s collapse, but perhaps one positive effect is its prompt to many businesses to take a look to see if they have their own house in order.

In January this year, construction giant Carillion entered into liquidation. In a sense its demise was sudden – the firm entered straight into liquidation rather than the more familiar administration procedure, meaning it had no meaningful assets that gave any prospect of the business, or any part of it, continuing as a going concern. But in another sense it was expected: a large failure of this type had been expected by industry watchers for some time.