The saga of Carillion's collapse continued this month, as it transpired that accountancy giants EY had prepared plans to restructure the troubled construction firm as early as mid-December 2017.

The insolvency of Carillion has placed into sharp relief the difficulties faced by those both up and down the contractual chain for a construction project when one part of that chain becomes insolvent and the ultimate supplier of goods and materials on site has not been paid.

Carillion was perhaps best known for its public sector work. However, the insolvency of the UK’s second-largest construction company will inevitably have significant implications for the private sector.

The fallout from Carillion's collapse in January continues to play out as it transpired this week that the company had delayed payments to subcontractors by up to 120 days. Carillion allegedly used tactics such as faulting invoices and finding minor problems with work undertaken in order to delay payment.

Much has already been said about the demise of Carillion and the impact of its liquidation on the various parties with whom it contracted. In this article, I would like to examine what light the demise of Carillion throws on themes commonly encountered within insolvency and whether there are lessons to be learned for everyone.

Having read the various reports in the press, it is clear that whilst Carillion entered into multi-billion pound government contracts, the contracts had extremely small profit margins, ultimately rendering the business unsustainable.

In light of the collapse of Carillion, businesses have contacted us to ensure that their position with suppliers and customers are as robustly protected as they can be. Often they are not. So here are my five top tips:

1. Know your client.

Media attention has waned from the initial deluge of front-page headlines regarding the Carillion collapse. It would therefore be easy to be ignorant of the ongoing disintegration of the web of Carillion companies beneath Carillion Plc, the ultimate parent company of the Carillion group, which (according to its latest accounts) holds interests in over 350 subsidiaries or joint ventures all over the world.

The collapse of Carillion has raised many issues relating to public procurement, the actions of the board and the role of the auditors. But a press release by the Institute of Directors suggesting that in 2016 Carillion relaxed the clawback conditions that applied to bonuses has raised questions over remuneration governance.

Following three profit warnings in recent months, the collapse of Carillion under a mountain of debt could hardly be described as a surprise. The fact that Carillion has entered compulsory liquidation may raise eyebrows. Administration would have allowed the company to continue operating whilst buyers were sought for those parts of the business that remained viable; liquidation is an acknowledgement that, by the time it collapsed, Carillion simply had no assets to sell that anyone would have been interested in buying. All that was left were the contracts.

Carillion, the second largest building contractor in the UK and the lead on a number of key public service contracts, entered into liquidation last week. Various commentators have highlighted poor governance at the company but would the revised UK Corporate Governance Code recently announced by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) have prevented its collapse?

What caused the collapse?