The Insolvency Service (IS), acting on behalf of the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, commenced disqualification proceedings against five former non-executive directors (NEDs) of Carillion plc in January 2021, following the compulsory liquidation of the Carillion Group in January 2018. Last month on the eve of trial, the IS discontinued its disqualification proceedings against the NEDs.
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s decision in Carillion Canada Inc. clarifies how the principles in Montréal (City) v. Deloitte Restructuring Inc. (Montréal) should be applied to contingent obligations that are only quantified after the debtor company files for creditor protection.
In the last week we have seen MPs criticise accountancy firms, KPMG, Deloitte, EY and PWC in their first report on the collapse of Carillion, describing the big four as “a cosy club” and calling for the firms to be forcibly broken up. Whilst not suggesting that the firms were to blame for the collapse, it is the level of fees reportedly paid to the firms which caught the MPs attention– £72 million in 10 years.
It is no great surprise that following the collapse of Carillion and with other retail businesses teetering on the edge, insolvency and corporate recovery is back in the news.
Some of the biggest casualties of entities like Carillion are the employees. Luckily, in the Carillion failure many jobs have been saved, but there is still a residual cost to employees who have to submit claims to the National Insurance Fund and the liquidator to recover payments for unpaid wages, holiday and sick pay.
Media attention has waned from the initial deluge of front-page headlines regarding the Carillion collapse. It would therefore be easy to be ignorant of the ongoing disintegration of the web of Carillion companies beneath Carillion Plc, the ultimate parent company of the Carillion group, which (according to its latest accounts) holds interests in over 350 subsidiaries or joint ventures all over the world.
On 15 January 2018, Carillion, the UK’s second-largest builder and one of the Government’s largest contractors, was placed into compulsory liquidation and the Official Receiver was appointed as liquidator, with Michael John Andrew Jervis, David James Kelly, David Christian Chubb, Peter Dickens, David Matthew Hammond and Russell Downs of PwC being appointed as special managers to assist in the wind down of the business and realisation of its assets.
Since the news of Thomas Cook’s demise a lot of focus has been on its travel customers. But beyond repatriating stranded holiday makers, the impact of large scale insolvencies such as Thomas Cook, Carillion and British Steel can be far reaching.
Those relying on the likes of Thomas Cook for business may also face financial distress as the impact of its insolvency ripples down the supply chain. Potentially impacting suppliers of goods and services, those who relied on Thomas Cook’s business outside of the UK, employees and landlords.
Concerns regarding the strength of UK supply chains and the consequences which arise when links in the chain fail, are not new and were recently subject to significant scrutiny in the context of Brexit negotiations. But with COVID-19 causing a host of new problems for already stressed supply chains, what can businesses do to protect themselves?
Carillion, the UK’s second largest construction company, entered compulsory liquidation on 15 January 2018, with estimated debts of £1.5bn and a pension deficient of c£800m, following three profit warnings in 2017. The company employs 20,000 people in the UK and 43,000 people worldwide. It is thought that some 30,000 companies may be affected by the liquidation.
In recent months certain restructuring processes have gained quite some notoriety in press headlines in connection with a number of UK businesses. This article provides secured lenders with a brief recap on the key points to note in relation to CVAs (Company Voluntary Arrangements) and what Liquidation means in the context of Carillion.
Retail CVAs