Corporate financial uncertainties or troubles frequently require corporate directors to make difficult choices that affect shareholders, creditors and others having an interest in the corporation. In that situation, the question naturally arises: Do directors' duties change when a corporation is experiencing financial difficulties, is nearing insolvency or becomes insolvent? The short answer is that the fiduciary duties of corporate directors under Delaware and Texas corporate law do not change, but that the ultimate beneficiaries of those duties may shift.

After a relatively brief and checkered stint in Delaware courts, it appears that the cause of action against corporate directors for “deepening insolvency” may have lost its place in Delaware corporate jurisprudence.

Retiree benefits are often a central issue in bankruptcy cases. For many employers the high cost of retiree medical benefits has been a significant contributing factor to the Chapter 11 filing and a matter of ongoing concern if the debtor is to be able to successfully reorganize. Understandably, employees, retirees and unions are equally concerned about the status of retiree benefits. Their obvious interest is to attempt to prevent the erosion of benefits that had been expected to be available during retirement.

Directors and officers managing corporations, especially when the corporation is insolvent or operating in insolvency situations, need to be cognizant of their fiduciary duties. This alert provides a brief overview of these fiduciary duties, including practical considerations in the exercise of these duties.

Fiduciary Duties When a Corporation is Solvent

Last month, in a significant ruling in the General Growth Properties, Inc. (“GGP”) bankruptcy case, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York denied motions to dismiss, as bad faith filings, the bankruptcy cases of 20 purported bankruptcyremote special purpose entity (“SPE”) subsidiary debtors.1

The Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) purported to eliminate the ability of chapter 11 debtors in possession to pay bonuses to management through Key Employee Retention Plans. However, in recognition of the fact that a real need often exists to incentivize key employees to remain with a reorganizing or liquidating business, bankruptcy courts have approved incentive plans providing for payments to insiders and other employees. Such plans must be carefully crafted to avoid the restrictions on retention bonuses post-BAPCPA.

In an area of the law that continues to be active, the federal bankruptcy court in Delaware has once again issued a detailed ruling on the actions of directors and officers leading up to a company's insolvency. Among the notable conclusions are: (1) failure to conduct due diligence before obtaining a loan may support a claim for breach of duty of care; and (2) there is no cause of action for "improvident lending" in Delaware or New Jersey. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Fedders N. Am., Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Credit Partners L.P. (In re Fedders N. Am., Inc.), 405 B.R.

The US government’s foray into restructuring the ailing US automotive industry has been widely reported in the media and represents the most substantial federal intervention in the private business sector since the Great Depression. In Chrysler’s case, the government took the unprecedented step of orchestrating a “surgical” Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing with the primary goal of utilizing the provisions of Section 363 of the US Bankruptcy Code to sell substantially all of Chrysler’s assets to “New Chrysler” in less than 30 days.

Directors of California corporations have, for years, struggled to understand the scope of their fiduciary duties when a corporation is insolvent versus when a corporation is in the “zone of insolvency.” While other states (particularly Delaware) have provided some recent guidance in this area[1], the California Court of Appeal recently provided some much needed clarification – including providing comfort to the decision making processes of directors who are considering various alternatives when a corporation enters into a zone of insolvency.

Break-up fees1 remain difficult for initial (or so-called “stalking horse”) bidders to obtain in the Third Circuit. In Kelson Channelview LLC v. Reliant Energy Channelview LP (In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP), No. 09-2074 (3d Cir. Jan.