A debtor's decision to assume or reject an executory contract is typically given deferential treatment by bankruptcy courts under a "business judgment" standard. Certain types of nondebtor parties to such contracts, however, have been afforded special protections. For example, in 1988, Congress added section 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code, granting some intellectual property licensees the right to continued use of licensed property, notwithstanding a debtor's rejection of the underlying license agreement.
A recent bankruptcy case in Pennsylvania,In re Shubh Hotels Pittsburgh, LLC, 439 B.R. 637 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2010), held that as long as the “debtor-in-possession” exercises its sound business judgment when making its decision, the “debtor-in-possession” can enter into a new 15-year franchise agreement over the objection of the secured lender.
Over the past five years, courts have issued rulings of potential concern to buyers of distressed debt. Courts have addressed, among other things, “loan to own” acquisition strategies resulting in vote designation; equitable subordination, disallowance, and other lender liability exposure based upon the claim seller’s misconduct; disclosure requirements for ad hoc committees of debtholders; the adequacy of standardized claims-trading agreements; and claim-filing requirements in the era of computerized records.
The Delaware Court of Chancery recently issued an opinion in Quadrant Structured Products Company1that addresses creditors’ rights to bring derivative lawsuits against directors and officers of a corporation. The Court held that Delaware law does not impose a continuous insolvency requirement and that the “traditional balance sheet test” is the appropriate test for determining solvency. The opinion also provides a roadmap on the current landscape under Delaware law for analyzing breach of fiduciary duty claims.
The Court of Chancery of Delaware recently issued a noteworthy decision clarifying fiduciary duties and confirming business judgment rule protection for board-level business strategy decisions by directors of insolvent corporations.1 Quadrant Structured Products Company v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155 (Del. Ch. 2014).
As a company turns in the widening gyre of financial distress, its directors and officers are often confronted with situations that require them to make difficult decisions. Should things fall apart, those decisions may give rise to claims that directors or officers breached their fiduciary duties to the company. A
Directors of an insolvent corporation face a host of difficult questions. Should they wind up operations or file for bankruptcy to preserve assets for creditors, or chart a riskier course that could lead the company back to profitability and possibly create value for shareholders? If they choose the riskier course and it fails, will the directors be potentially liable to creditors? The opinion issued by Vice Chancellor Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery earlier this month in Quadrant Structured Products Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, C.A. No. 6990-VCL, slip op., 2014 Del. Ch.
In its October 1, 2014 decision in Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, et al., C.A. No. 6990, the Delaware Court of Chancery applied the protections afforded under the business judgment rule to investment strategies adopted by directors of insolvent corporations. The court held that the business judgment rule barred derivative claims asserted against directors by a creditor who had alleged that the company’s high-risk investment strategy was implemented for the purpose of benefitting the corporation’s controller at the creditors’ expense.
In Quadrant Structured Products Company, Ltd. v. Vertin (October 1, 2014), Vice Chancellor Laster clarified the Delaware Chancery Court’s approach to breach of fiduciary duty derivative actions brought by creditors against the directors of an insolvent corporation.
On June 20, 2014, the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ritchie v. Rupe, 2014 Tex. LEXIS 500 (Tex. 2014). In Ritchie, a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation attempted to force the majority shareholders to buy-out the minority shareholder’s interest in the corporation by bringing a claim of shareholder oppression under § 11.404 of the Texas Business Organizations Code (TBOC), the Texas receivership statute.