In a significant Delaware law decision regarding creditors’ ability to sue corporate fiduciaries, the Delaware Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of whether a corporate director owes fiduciary duties to the creditors of a company that is insolvent or in the “zone of insolvency.” In North American Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, the court concluded that directors of a solvent Delaware corporation that is operating in the zone of insolvency owe their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders, and not creditors.

In Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) and the debtors’ lenders sought approval of a settlement prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization. While the Court concluded that many aspects of the settlement might otherwise be approved, it found that a provision that distributed funds in violation of the absolute priority rule lacked sufficient justification.

On the Friday before Labor Day, Judge James Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York shocked the distressed bond market by dismissing the preference and fraudulent transfer counts of Iridium LLC Creditors Committee’s $3.7 billion adversary proceeding against Motorola, Inc. Judge Peck found that the Committee had failed to prove that Iridium was insolvent at any time—even the day before bankruptcy. Iridium’s $1.6 billion in bonds dropped from the mid-20s to low single digits in days.

In 1991, a decision of the Delaware Chancery Court helped popularize the term "zone of insolvency.”[1] In the intervening 16 years, numerous courts and commentators have cited this decision as standing for the proposition that the directors of a Delaware corporation that is either insolvent or in the zone of insolvency owe fiduciary duties to the creditors, as well as to the shareholders, of the corporation.

The Bankruptcy Code limits the amount a landlord may recover from a bankrupt tenant for damages caused by the termination of a lease of real property. But what if the tenant trashes the landlord's property before turning over the premises? Does the damage limitation apply to the landlord's claim for the cost of cleaning up the mess?

A company attempting to reorganize its affairs in bankruptcy may seek to enjoin its creditors or other third parties from suing members of the company's senior management team during the course of the reorganization proceedings, so that the senior management members can devote their time and resources to the reorganization effort without distraction. Courts throughout the country have applied differing standards in determining when the granting of an injunction of proceedings against a non-debtor is appropriate.

The Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decision in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla1 addresses the fiduciary duties of corporate directors in Delaware. In affirming a lower court decision by the Delaware Court of Chancery,2 the Delaware Supreme Court held that creditors of a Delaware corporation that is insolvent or in the “zone of insolvency” have no right to bring direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty against directors.

This past summer, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that "deepening insolvency" is not a recognized theory of damages in Minnesota. Christians v. Thornton, 733 N.W.2d 803 (Minn. App. 2007). In September, the Supreme Court of Minnesota denied a petition to review, 2007 Minn. LEXIS 572 (Minn. Sept. 18, 2007), leaving in place a decision that is an enormous relief to officers and directors of troubled companies, to banks that have lent to troubled companies, and to professionals such as lawyers, accountants and investment brokers who have provided services to troubled companies.

District Judge James D. Zagel of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on Nov. 9, 2007, ordered a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to "immediately" pay its so-called "commitment" and "DIP Facility Funding" fees. ("Loan Fees"). Arlington LF, LLC, v. Arlington Hospitality, Inc., 2007 WL 3334499 (N.D. Ill. 11/9/07). Reversing the bankruptcy court, the district court held that the DIP was not excused from paying the fees despite the lender's earlier refusal to advance further funds on its $6 million revolving loan agreement ("Revolver"). Id. at 5.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has held that a severance payment made to an executive who worked for both Enron Corp. (“Enron”) and various affiliates of Enron prior to Enron’s filing for bankruptcy was a preferential transfer that could be avoided by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”).1 In reaching this conclusion, the Bankruptcy Court rejected the argument that the severance payment was an “ordinary course” transaction that was protected from avoidance.