In its continued effort to implement its authority to resolve “covered financial companies” under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), on March 15, 2011, the Board of Directors of the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”) approved the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Proposed Rules”).

Directors and officers of troubled companies are already keenly cognizant of their potential liability for any breaches of fiduciary duty, negligence and fraud.

On May 18, 2007, in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla (“Gheewalla”),1 the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision2 in which the Court of Chancery precluded creditors from filing direct suits for breach of fiduciary duty against directors of corporations that are either in the zone of insolvency or are actually insolvent. With its decision, the Delaware Supreme Court has limited creditors’ ability to sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty.

This note sets out the duties of the following directors of French companies with a particular focus on the duties owed by such directors of companies in financial difficulties:

The German parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) has recently passed a law on the restructuring and dissolution of distressed financial institutions, establishing a sector-wide restructuring fund and extending the statute of limitations for the liability board members (Restructuring Act).

In recent opinions, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have revisited the doctrine of equitable subordination and have underscored the requirement that, before a court can equitably subordinate a creditor’s claim, the court must find that other creditors have been harmed by the actions of the creditor. Importantly, both decisions stress that equitable subordination is meant to be remedial and not punitive, and may not be imposed merely because a creditor has engaged in misconduct.

In Mukamal v. Bakes,1 the trustee of two trusts created under a chapter 11 plan of reorganization filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) against the former directors and officers of the debtors, the dominant shareholders of the debtors and the debtors’ accounting firm, alleging, among other things, various breaches of fiduciary duties.

In a long-awaited decision released on February 22, 2011, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in favor of Barclays Capital in Lehman Brothers Holding Inc.’s multi-billion-dollar lawsuit arising out of the sale of Lehman’s investment banking and brokerage assets, which occurred in September of 2008.

Creditors of insolvent Delaware corporations have recourse against corporate directors and officers whose disloyal or self-dealing conduct reduces the corporation’s assets available for distribution. Delaware courts have held that directors and officers of insolvent corporations owe fiduciary duties to creditors as the principal stakeholders in the remaining corporate assets. Where those duties are breached, creditors have standing to bring actions derivatively on behalf of the corporation for damages to the corporation. However, in a recent decision by Vice Chancellor J.

For debtors with limited liabilities, little surplus income and minimal gross assets, the new Debt Relief Order (DRO) is a further tool to consider in managing their debts. DROs, which came into force on 6 April 2009, are aimed at those who find they are unable to pay off their debts within a reasonable time but for whom other forms of debt relief, such as bankruptcy or Individual Voluntary Arrangements, are unavailable, or perhaps unaffordable.

What are the criteria for a DRO?

A DRO can be applied for where the debtor: