Just in time for the fifth anniversary of the enactment of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows foreign debtors to administer assets located in the U.S. or stay the actions of U.S. creditors – Judge Martin Glenn of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has issued a decision reaffirming the broad utility and scope of chapter 15.

In Hutson v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.

In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Moran Towing Corp. (In re Bethlehem Steel Corp.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that preferential transfer claims were not arbitrable. The Court reasoned that because the avoidance powers did not belong to the debtor, but rather were creditor claims that could only be brought by a trustee or debtor-in-possession, they were not subject to the arbitration clauses in contracts to which the creditors were not parties.

The Dispute and the Arbitration Clauses

Late last year, government responses to the subprime mortgage crisis proliferated but most attention focused on those measures that could be, and in some cases were, rapidly implemented — measures like the Treasury Department’s urging holders of certain subprime adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) to freeze interest rates temporarily or the Federal Reserve’s proposed tightening of lending requirements.

On July 23, 2015, in an action arising from the huge TCEH chapter 11 bankruptcy, Judge Paul A. Engelmayer of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion in Delaware Trust Company v.

On May 25, 2012, Judge Allan L. Gropper of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved a motion to compel the production of certain documents under section 1521 of the Bankruptcy Code.  In his decision, Judge Gropper also suggested that the broad discovery provisions of Bankruptcy Rule 2004 may apply to chapter 15 discovery requests, but stopped short of making such a ruling.  In re Millennium Global Emerging Credit Master Fund Limited, Case No. 11-13171 (ALG), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y May 25, 2012).

In the W.R. Grace bankruptcy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reaffirmed its prior rulings on the controversial issue of a bankruptcy court’s power to enjoin actions by third parties against non-debtors.1 Resting on prior precedent, the Third Circuit held that bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin third party actions that have no direct effect upon the bankruptcy estate.

Introduction

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled recently on the validity of “gift plans” – plans of reorganization under which a senior creditor “gifts” assets to a junior creditor or equity holder.1 In In re Journal Register Co.,2 Bankruptcy Judge Alan L. Gropper approved a plan in which secured lenders gifted a portion of their recovery to certain trade creditors, and detailed some of the important limitations on gift plans.

Evolution of the Gift Plan Doctrine

The current economic recession has, not surprisingly, led to a significant downturn in the domestic gaming industry. During 2008, revenue growth in the U.S. gaming industry turned negative for the first time in four years. Data for the first quarter of 2009 indicate that the monthly gaming revenues of casinos in Las Vegas and Atlantic City declined more than 15% as compared to the first quarter of last year.1 Public gaming company stock prices are down more than 80% on average, and many gaming companies have postponed or canceled development projects.

In In re Bryan Road LLC,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida considered whether a waiver of the automatic stay provision included in a prepetition workout agreement is enforceable in the debtor’s subsequent bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court enforced the waiver and held the creditor was not bound by the automatic stay after engaging in a four-factor analysis of the agreement and the circumstances surrounding its execution. The Bankruptcy Court cautioned, however, that relief from stay provisions are neither per se enforceable nor self-executing.