The next time you negotiate a settlement payment with a financially troubled party, you may want to keep in mind an ancient term related to livestock herding: earmarking. The concept may be somewhat antiquated, but the Second Circuit has recently confirmed that it is still viable – and can help you keep the settlement payment if the other party later files for bankruptcy.

On November 8, 2018, Judge Vyskocil of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision dismissing the involuntary petition that had been filed against Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. (“Taberna”), a non-recourse CDO, thus ending a nearly seventeen-month-long saga that was followed closely by bankruptcy practitioners and securitization professionals alike. SeeTaberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd. v. Opportunities II Ltd., et. al., (In re Taberna Preferred Funding IV, Ltd.), No. 17-11628 (MKV), 2018 WL 5880918, at *24 (Bankr.

On May 1, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In re Federal–Mogul Global, Inc. confirmed that anti-assignment provisions in a debtor’s insurance liability policies are preempted by the Bankruptcy Code to the extent they prohibit the transfer of a debtor’s rights under such policies to a personal-injury trust pursuant to a chapter 11 plan.In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., --- F.3d ---, 2012 WL 1511773 (3d Cir. 2012).

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently dismissed equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer claims filed by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Champion Enterprises, Inc. ("Champion") against more than 100 prepetition lenders to Champion (collectively, the "Defendants")1.

Introduction

Several recent bankruptcy decisions rendered in the Third Circuit address whether the disclosure requirements of Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure apply to informal or “ad hoc” committees.1 Although these courts base their reasoning on the “plain meaning” of Rule 2019, their ultimate holdings are inconsistent and have generated renewed interest in this topic among lenders and the investing community. This article provides a brief summary of these recent decisions and examines their inconsistencies.

Last week, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey,2 establishing an important precedent concerning the ability of bankruptcy courts to release claims against third party non-debtors in chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In the June 2009 issue of Cadwalader’s Restructuring Review newsletter, we introduced this case and considered the potential implications of a ruling on this important but unsettled topic.

In In re Arch Wireless,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a creditor who asserted claims against the debtor in various correspondence between the parties was a “known” claimant of the debtor’s estate entitled to direct notice of the bar date by which it must file a proof of claim. The Court of Appeals concluded that publication notice was insufficient to inform the creditor of the bar date or of the terms of the confirmed plan, even though the creditor was generally aware of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.

In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “U.S. Court”) exercised its abstention powers and dismissed an involuntary chapter 11 petition filed against an Argentine company, Compania de Alimentos Fargo, SA (“Fargo”).1 Fargo, a debtor in an insolvency proceeding in Argentina, had moved to dismiss the involuntary petition principally because its Argentine bankruptcy case was still pending.

On March 11, 2016, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued an opinion in the Energy Future Holdings bankruptcy that resolved an intercreditor dispute over $90 million in proceeds to be distributed under the plan of reorganization.

On June 28, 2012, Judge Allan Gropper of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York declined to appoint an official committee of equity holders in Kodak’s chapter 11 cases.  The bankruptcy court determined that the appointment of an official committee was not warranted at that time, given that the costs to the bankruptcy estates would be substantial and equity’s interests were already represented by other constituencies seeking to maximize value and by a sophisticatedad hoc group of shareholders.  In re Eastman Kodak Company, Case No