Bankruptcy courts lack the power to impose serious punitive sanctions, a federal district judge ruled recently in PHH Mortgage Corporation v. Sensenich, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207801 (D. Vt. Dec. 18, 2018). Judge Geoffrey Crawford reversed a bankruptcy judge’s ruling that had imposed sanctions against a creditor based on Rule 3002.1(i) of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the bankruptcy court’s inherent authority, and Bankruptcy Code section 105.
In Levin v. Verizon Bus. Global, LLC (In re OneStar Long Distance, Inc.), 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18374 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 2017), the Seventh Circuit recently addressed a situation where a debtor sought to reduce a creditor’s new value defense in a preference avoidance action.
Figuring out when a pre-petition waiver of a jury trial will be respected in lawsuits brought in bankruptcy cases can be tricky. In a recent case, In re D.I.T., Inc., 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3386 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2017), a court distinguished between claims belonging to a debtor pre-petition and those belonging to a debtor-in-possession.
Unsecured creditors and other stakeholders sometimes challenge the reasonableness of fees incurred by estate professionals in a bankruptcy case. Whether this is to augment unsecured creditor recoveries or serve as a check on the private bar is in the eye of the beholder. Whatever the reason, fee litigation in bankruptcy caused many professionals to seek payment from the bankruptcy estate for any fees incurred defending against an objection to their fees.
Recently, in Gupta v. Quincy Medical Center, 858 F.3d 657 (1st Cir. 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit clarified the limits of the bankruptcy courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction over civil proceedings. The decision, authored by Judge Lipez and joined by retired Supreme Court Justice David Souter (sitting by designation), provides a thorough analysis of the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction in such cases.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago has issued a decision with significant implications for licensees of trademarks whose licensors become debtors in bankruptcy. In Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, the Court considered whether rejection of a trademark license in bankruptcy deprives the licensee of the right to use the licensed mark.1 Disagreeing with the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v.
Channel 1 – Thorpe Insulation Addresses Insurer Standing to Object to Plan and Assignability of Insurance Contracts to Plan Trusts
Bottom Line:
On November 13, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and its affiliated debtors in Chapter 11 (collectively, “Lehman”) filed a motion (the “Motion”) seeking Bankruptcy Court approval of procedures (the “Procedures”) for the assumption and assignment of derivative contracts not yet terminated by its various counterparties, as well confirmation of Lehman’s right to enter into settlement agreements for the termination of derivative contracts that have been terminated by its counterparties post-petition.
The Ninth Circuit, in Blixseth v. Credit Suisse, 961 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2020), issued a significant decision on the issue of whether nonconsensual third-party releases are ever permitted in Chapter 11 plans. Distinguishing its prior decisions on the topic, the Ninth Circuit permitted a nonconsensual third-party release that was limited to the exculpation of participants in the reorganization from claims based on actions taken during the case.
Statutory Background