Directors and officers of Delaware corporations face no liability to corporate creditors from direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty, under the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent ruling in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, (May 18, 2007) (“North American Catholic”).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that the bankruptcy court’s exclusive jurisdiction to dispose of estate property did not preclude the enforcement of an arbitration provision.

Is a landlord’s ability to recover repair costs chargeable to the lessee limited because such repair costs are included in “damages resulting from the termination of a lease of real property” pursuant to section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code? In In re Foamex International, Inc., 2007 WL 1461954 (Bankr. D. Del. May 16, 2007), the bankruptcy judge said “Yes.”

On May 18, 2007, in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla (“Gheewalla”),1 the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision2 in which the Court of Chancery precluded creditors from filing direct suits for breach of fiduciary duty against directors of corporations that are either in the zone of insolvency or are actually insolvent. With its decision, the Delaware Supreme Court has limited creditors’ ability to sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty.

Equitable mootness is a doctrine grounded in equity pursuant to which an appeals court will dismiss an appeal of a bankruptcy order — even if effective relief could conceivably have been granted — because the implementation of such relief (e.g., the reversal of a bankruptcy court order) would be inequitable to third parties. This doctrine may be applied to achieve the necessary finality of bankruptcy orders and decisions that is required to effectuate the successful, expedient reorganization of debtors in bankruptcy.2

In re Adelphia Communications Corp.,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently held that neither a creditor’s aggressive litigation tactics resulting in the creditor’s prospective receipt under a proposed plan of special consideration for voting in favor of the plan, which special consideration other members of the same class that voted against the plan would not obtain, nor the creditor’s ownership of claims in several debtors, in a multi-debtor Chapter 11 case, was a sufficient basis for the “draconian sanction” of disallowing such creditor’s votes

In a recent decision by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, In re Scotia Development, LLC,1 Judge Richard S. Schmidt denied the motions of several creditors and the State of California seeking transfer of venue from the Southern District of Texas to the Northern District of California, finding that venue was proper in Texas and that California would not be a more convenient forum for the financial restructuring of the debtors.

Background

While investors and lenders brace for the next wave of chapter 11 filings, those who are parties to intercreditor agreements need to take stock on how their relationship with their fellow creditors and the borrower may be impacted by a bankruptcy filing by the borrower. If the borrower is in financial extremes, the primary lender who is secured by all the business assets may be unwilling or unable to extend additional credit to the troubled borrower.

More than a year and a half has passed since the Bankruptcy Code was significantly revised pursuant to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) which became effective (with some exceptions) on October 17, 2005. While the full impact of BAPCPA will not be fully realized for years to come, it is already apparent that trade creditors stand to benefit significantly as a result of these amendments.

Expanded Administrative Expense and Reclamation Rights

How to Keep Follow-On Investments from Getting Squeezed