The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to hear a chapter 11 debtor's breach of contract and tortious interference claims, which the debtor filed after its chapter 11 plan had been confirmed and substantially consummated. Valley Historic Limited Partnership v. Bank of New York, No. 06-1571,___ F.3d ___, WL 1439734 (4th Cir. May 17, 2007). This decision delineates the limits of bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over claims filed by the debtor after plan confirmation.

Background

On Friday, March 3, 2006, Dana Corporation and certain of its affiliated companies (collectively, “Dana") filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in New York. None of Dana's foreign incorporated affiliates are included in this bankruptcy petition and as such, any transaction with such affiliates should continue in the normal course. However, as a result of the bankruptcy filing, an automatic stay is in effect prohibiting creditors from seeking to take action to collect any amounts due to them from Dana which arose prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

On March 15, 2007, with Jones Day’s assistance as bankruptcy counsel, FLYi, Inc. (“FLYi”), Independence Air, Inc. (“Independence”) and their affiliated debtors (collectively, the “Debtors”) obtained confirmation of their chapter 11 plan under the “cramdown” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The plan, which become effective on March 30, 2007, will distribute approximately $150 million to unsecured creditors. In ruling on confirmation of the plan, the U.S.

The ability to borrow money during the course of a bankruptcy case is an important tool available to a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP”). Often times, the debtor’s most logical choice for a lender is one with an existing pre-bankruptcy relationship with the debtor. As a condition to making new loans, however, lenders commonly require the debtor to waive its right to pursue avoidance or lender liability actions against the lender based upon pre-bankruptcy events.

“Give ups” by senior classes of creditors to achieve confirmation of a plan have become an increasingly common feature of the chapter 11 process, as stakeholders strive to avoid disputes that can prolong the bankruptcy case and drain estate assets by driving up administrative costs.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that the bankruptcy court’s exclusive jurisdiction to dispose of estate property did not preclude the enforcement of an arbitration provision.

Is a landlord’s ability to recover repair costs chargeable to the lessee limited because such repair costs are included in “damages resulting from the termination of a lease of real property” pursuant to section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code? In In re Foamex International, Inc., 2007 WL 1461954 (Bankr. D. Del. May 16, 2007), the bankruptcy judge said “Yes.”

On May 18, 2007, in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla (“Gheewalla”),1 the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision2 in which the Court of Chancery precluded creditors from filing direct suits for breach of fiduciary duty against directors of corporations that are either in the zone of insolvency or are actually insolvent. With its decision, the Delaware Supreme Court has limited creditors’ ability to sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty.

Equitable mootness is a doctrine grounded in equity pursuant to which an appeals court will dismiss an appeal of a bankruptcy order — even if effective relief could conceivably have been granted — because the implementation of such relief (e.g., the reversal of a bankruptcy court order) would be inequitable to third parties. This doctrine may be applied to achieve the necessary finality of bankruptcy orders and decisions that is required to effectuate the successful, expedient reorganization of debtors in bankruptcy.2

In re Adelphia Communications Corp.,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently held that neither a creditor’s aggressive litigation tactics resulting in the creditor’s prospective receipt under a proposed plan of special consideration for voting in favor of the plan, which special consideration other members of the same class that voted against the plan would not obtain, nor the creditor’s ownership of claims in several debtors, in a multi-debtor Chapter 11 case, was a sufficient basis for the “draconian sanction” of disallowing such creditor’s votes