The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied a creditor’s motion to compel the debtor to surrender mortgaged property and also denied the debtor’s motion to stay the case, holding that a chapter 7 debtor who indicates surrender of real property in his statement of intention is not obligated to surrender that property to the lienholder, whether or not the property is administered by the chapter 7 trustee.

In In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, the question before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware was whether an investor who “bought and paid for [one] Common Unit (including all rights related thereto),”

I sense a sea change in the recent Delaware decision in Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, 2016 WL 3185576 (6/3/16), refusing to enforce a bankruptcy proofing provision of a Delaware LLC’s operating agreement. Until recently, the trend had been to accept the fundamental principles of bankruptcy remoteness, although courts sometimes found ways to avoid honoring anti-bankruptcy devices in specific cases.

Since April, two bankruptcy courts have refused to enforce limited liability company ("LLC") agreement provisions requiring the respective LLCs to obtain the unanimous consent of their members in order to seek bankruptcy relief.1 On June 3, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Delaware Bankruptcy Court") relied on federal public policy to invalidate an LLC agreement provision requiring unanimous member consent to file bankruptcy where the member at issue owed no fiduciary duties to the LLC and the member's primary relationship to the

A recent decision from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas caught our eye because of the unconventional opening line:

“Summers are hot in Texas, so pools are a hot item. But not hot enough to help a pool installer [ . . . ] avoid bankruptcy” – Judge Tony M. Davis, United States Bankruptcy Judge.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently held that a confirmable Chapter 13 plan cannot both “vest” title to real property and “surrender” that property to a secured lender, and that the secured lender may refuse to accept the vesting in satisfaction of its claim.

Thus, the Court held that a debtor may not force the transfer of title in collateral to a secured creditor in satisfaction of the secured creditor’s claim, without the consent of the secured creditor.

Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq., provides the legal framework by which U.S. bankruptcy courts recognize foreign insolvency proceedings of companies that have assets and operations in more than one country. Congress added Chapter 15 to the Bankruptcy Code with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. Like any new law, the application and limits of Chapter 15 are developing through jurisprudence.

Creditors are often compelled to commence expensive and time consuming litigation to first prosecute their claims and then locate and seize a debtor's assets. During this lengthy and costly process, the debtor's assets are dissipated and the creditor may realize only a fraction of its claim. The Bankruptcy Code¹ allows a trustee to liquidate a debtor's assets in a cost-effective, expeditious manner. Because of this, involuntary bankruptcy is a powerful tool that can expedite and maximize payments to affected creditors.

Freight brokers are well-accustomed to bankruptcy preference actions. Those actions, which are permitted under the Bankruptcy Code, allow a debtor, trustee or other bankruptcy estate representative to claw back payments made on account of antecedent debt in the 90 days prior to a bankruptcy filing. Trade creditors, especially those in the transportation industry, are often faced with significant preference claims because they provide service to debtors up until (and sometimes after) the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.

Key Notes: